On Mon 2009-11-02 18:53:19, Martin Rex wrote: > Jim Paris wrote: > > > > > Therefor it's totally of no influence what you do with the original > > > directory permission. File access has nothing to do with directory > > > permissions...! > > > > Right. However the whole point of this discussion is that that is a > > non-obvious point, there was no other way that the user could have > > opened that file without the use of /proc. > > The actual fallacy of the "problem report" is the flawed assumption > about what a link count of 1 tells you. > > The link count of a files tells you the number of hard links that > are persisted within the same filesystem. It is _NOT_ a promise > that there are no other means to access the inode of the file. It used to be promise before /proc was mounted. > /proc creates a virtual reference to an inode, and since it is > virtual (and in a different filesystem) and not persisted in the > original filesystem, you will not see it in the link count of > the original filesystem. Well, there _may_ be other filesystems with similar features, but they are neither common nor mounted by default. Normally, mounting filesystems does not change security properties of rest of the system; and it should be possible to fix in this case. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
