On Mon, 6 Dec 2004, Dan Kaminsky wrote: > I've been doing some analysis on MD5 collision announced by Wang et al. > Short version: Yes, Virginia, there is no such thing as a safe hash > collision -- at least in a function that's specified to be > cryptographically secure. The full details may be acquired at the > following link: The short-term fix seems to be something I've been recommending for a while: Compute hashes with both SHA-1 and MD5. The chance of one algorithm becoming compromised in the mid-term is relatively high IMHO (I was responsible for a PKI system which had to keep integrity for 20 year periods of time - not an easy task considering what we don't know about the future). The chance of two becoming compromised is relatively less. The chance of a problem with MD5 and SHA-1 allowing two different files to have collisions in both algorithms in *BOTH* is very very small. -- Joel