-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-security@xxxxxxxxxxx openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx OpenPKG-SA-2004.051 29-Nov-2004 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: imapd Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT <= imapd-2.2.9-20041123 >= imapd-2.2.10-20041124 OpenPKG 2.2 <= imapd-2.2.8-2.2.0 >= imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1 OpenPKG 2.1 <= imapd-2.2.6-2.1.0 >= imapd-2.2.6-2.1.1 Affected Releases: Dependent Packages: none Description: According to a security advisory from Stefan Esser [0], several vulnerabilities exist in Cyrus imapd. The updated OpenPKG packages fix all these problems. When the option "IMAPMAGICPLUS" is activated on a server, the "PROXY" and "LOGIN" commands suffer a standard stack overflow, because the username is not checked against a maximum length. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-1011 [2] to the problem. Due to a bug within the argument parser of the "PARTIAL" command buffer positions outside the allocated memory buffer may be accessed. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-1012 [3] to the problem. The argument parser of the "FETCH" command suffers a similar bug. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-1013 [4] to the problem. Under memory allocation failure conditions the "cmd_append" handler supporting "MULTIAPPENDS" may enter code paths doing post increments whose behavior is undefined in ANSI C. The same function also suffers from a integer wrap. No CVE id. Another "IMAPMAGICPLUS" overflow was later discovered by Thomas Klaeger in proxyd.c "proxyd_canon_user" function. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-1015 [5] to the problem. Sebastian Krahmer mentioned a missing NUL-termination in global.c and provided a patch. No CVE id. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -q imapd". If you have the "imapd" package installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it [6][7]. Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [8][9], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [10][11] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [12], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [6] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [7]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD ftp> get imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.*.rpm Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall all dependent packages (see above), if any, too [6][7]. ________________________________________________________________________ References: [0] http://security.e-matters.de/advisories/152004.html [1] http://asg.web.cmu.edu/cyrus/imapd/ [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1011 [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1012 [4] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1013 [5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1015 [6] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [7] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/imapd-2.2.6-2.1.1.src.rpm [10] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/ [11] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/ [12] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/ for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory. ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx> iD8DBQFBq0xYgHWT4GPEy58RAmf8AKCfU689XYrzG8sZyX2yarquUKE0VgCfSk/c lMGiX8Fe/lKwjvTkwffV/Xg= =DeKk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
