Re: PointGuard: It's not the Size of the Buffer, it's the Addressof the Pointer

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Florian Weimer wrote:

Crispin Cowan <crispin@immunix.com> writes:


Thanks to Snax and the Shmoo for a better tag line: It's not the Size
of the Buffer, it's the Address of the Pointer


This is not true.  There are buffer overflow exploits which do not
modify pointers, but other objects.  The most prominent example is
probably the "c c c c c..." exploit for the Solaris /bin/login
vulnerability.

Please address technical commentary to the paper (which addresses this point) and not to the cute tag line.

WRT this point: correct, PointGuard does not stop all buffer overflows. IMHO it *nearly* stops all shell code. To bypass PointGuard, you have to corrupt the logic of the program itself to get its own code to do what you want; you can't readily generate a jump to arbitrary code.

Caveat: I can't prove the above, and someone may generate a bypass. But I don't know of one.

Crispin

--
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.           http://immunix.com/~crispin/
Chief Scientist, Immunix       http://immunix.com
           http://www.immunix.com/shop/



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