Re: Ecardis Password Reseting Vulnerability

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In-Reply-To: <20030227071424.25278.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>

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>From: Haluk AYDIN <haydin@biznet.com.tr>
>To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
>Subject: Ecardis Password Reseting Vulnerability
>
>
>
>Hi,
>
>I don't know if someone has discovered this before but
Ecartis 1.0.0 
>(former listar) contains a vulnerability that enables
an attacker to reset 
>passwords of any user defined on the list server,
including the list 
>admins. 
>
>After logging on as a non-priviledged user, Ecartis
enables the user to 
>change his/her password, but does not ask for the old
one. The first time 
>I have seen this, I thought that the software relies
on the session 
>cookie, but it seems this is not the case. 
>
>The html page contains the username in the "hidden"
fields. After saving 
>the page on disk, then replacing all "hidden" fields
with another username 
>which is defined in the server, and reloading the page
again we can try 
>our chance to change the password. Just fill in the
empty password fields 
>with a password of your choice, and click "Change
Password": there you 
>are... You have just reset the victim's password.
>
>I have not tested this on different versions, but I
guess it will work for 
>all of them. I would appreciate any comments on the issue.
>
>Regards,
>


Thank you for bringing this to our attention, it was
fixed only a few hours after recieving this.

The FreeBSD port (which I maintain) has also been updated

Please use snapshot versions after 20030227, and make
sure the FreeBSD port is update as well.

-Trish Lynch - ecartis core team. 

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