On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 10:05:32PM -0700, Joanne Koong wrote: > On Sat, Apr 22, 2023 at 4:44 PM Alexei Starovoitov > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:46 PM Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 11:38 AM Alexei Starovoitov > > > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 12:14:10AM -0700, Joanne Koong wrote: > > > > > return obj; > > > > > @@ -2369,6 +2394,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, KF_RET_NULL) > > > > > BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_num_new, KF_ITER_NEW) > > > > > BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_num_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL) > > > > > BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_num_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY) > > > > > +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_adjust) > > > > > > > > I've missed this earlier. > > > > Shouldn't we change all the existing dynptr kfuncs to be KF_TRUSTED_ARGS? > > > > Otherwise when people start passing bpf_dynptr-s from kernel code > > > > (like fuse-bpf is planning to do) > > > > the bpf prog might get vanilla ptr_to_btf_id to bpf_dynptr_kern. > > > > It's probably not possible right now, so not a high-pri issue, but still. > > > > Or something in the verifier makes sure that dynptr-s are all trusted? > > > > > > In my understanding, the checks the verifier enforces for > > > KF_TRUSTED_ARGS are that the reg->offset is 0 and the reg may not be > > > null. The verifier logic does this for dynptrs currently, it enforces > > > that reg->offset is 0 (in stack_slot_obj_get_spi()) and that the > > > reg->type is PTR_TO_STACK or CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (in > > > check_kfunc_args() for KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR case). But maybe it's a > > > good idea to add the KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag anyways in case more safety > > > checks are added to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS in the future? > > > > Yeah. You're right. > > The verifier is doing the same checks for dynptr and for trusted ptrs. > > So adding KF_TRUSTED_ARGS to bpf_dynptr_adjust is not mandatory. > > Maybe an opportunity to generalize the checks between > > KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID and KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. > > But KF_TRUSTED_ARGS is necessary for bpf_dynptr_from_skb > > otherwise old style ptr_to_btf_id skb can be passed in. > > > > For example the following passes test_progs: > > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c > > index d9ce04ca22ce..abb14036b455 100644 > > --- a/net/core/filter.c > > +++ b/net/core/filter.c > > @@ -11718,6 +11718,7 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void) > > ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT, > > &bpf_kfunc_set_skb); > > ret = ret ?: > > register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL, > > &bpf_kfunc_set_skb); > > ret = ret ?: > > register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER, > > &bpf_kfunc_set_skb); > > + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, > > &bpf_kfunc_set_skb); > > return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, > > &bpf_kfunc_set_xdp); > > } > > late_initcall(bpf_kfunc_init); > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c > > b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c > > index b2fa6c47ecc0..bd8fbc3e04ea 100644 > > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c > > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > > #include <string.h> > > #include <linux/bpf.h> > > #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> > > +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h> > > #include "bpf_misc.h" > > #include "bpf_kfuncs.h" > > #include "errno.h" > > @@ -187,6 +188,15 @@ int test_skb_readonly(struct __sk_buff *skb) > > return 1; > > } > > > > +SEC("fentry/__kfree_skb") > > +int BPF_PROG(test_skb, struct __sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + struct bpf_dynptr ptr; > > + > > + bpf_dynptr_from_skb(skb, 0, &ptr); > > + return 0; > > +} > > > > but shouldn't. skb in fentry is not trusted. > > It's not an issue right now, because bpf_dynptr_from_skb() > > is enabled for networking prog types only, > > but BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER is already blending the boundary. > > It's more networking than tracing and normal tracing should > > be able to examine skb. dynptr allows to do it nicely. > > Not a blocker for this set. Just something to follow up. > > Ahh I see, thanks for the explanation. I'm trying to find where this > happens in the code - i see the check in the verifier for > is_trusted_reg() (when we call check_kfunc_args() for the > KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID case) so it seems like the skb ctx reg is trusted > if it's been marked as either MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED, and it's > untrusted if it's not. But where does this get marked as PTR_TRUSTED > for networking prog types? is_trusted_reg() applies to PTR_TO_BTF_ID pointers. For networking progs skb comes as PTR_TO_CTX which are implicitly trusted and from safety pov equivalent to PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED. But tracing progs are different. Arguments of tp_btf progs are also trusted, but fexit args are not. They're old legacy PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags. Neither PTR_TRUSTED nor PTR_UNTRUSTED. The purpose of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS is to filter out such pointers.