On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 10:56 AM Benjamin Tissoires
<benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 6:37 PM Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 7:29 AM Benjamin Tissoires
> > <benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Aug 26, 2022 at 3:51 AM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
> > > <memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, 26 Aug 2022 at 03:42, Alexei Starovoitov
> > > > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 6:41 AM Benjamin Tissoires
> > > > > <benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > When a function was trying to access data from context in a syscall eBPF
> > > > > > program, the verifier was rejecting the call unless it was accessing the
> > > > > > first element.
> > > > > > This is because the syscall context is not known at compile time, and
> > > > > > so we need to check this when actually accessing it.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Check for the valid memory access if there is no convert_ctx callback,
> > > > > > and allow such situation to happen.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > There is a slight hiccup with subprogs. btf_check_subprog_arg_match()
> > > > > > will check that the types are matching, which is a good thing, but to
> > > > > > have an accurate result, it hides the fact that the context register may
> > > > > > be null. This makes env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset being set to the size
> > > > > > of the context, which is incompatible with a NULL context.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Solve that last problem by storing max_ctx_offset before the type check
> > > > > > and restoring it after.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >
> > > > > > changes in v9:
> > > > > > - rewrote the commit title and description
> > > > > > - made it so all functions can make use of context even if there is
> > > > > > no convert_ctx
> > > > > > - remove the is_kfunc field in bpf_call_arg_meta
> > > > > >
> > > > > > changes in v8:
> > > > > > - fixup comment
> > > > > > - return -EACCESS instead of -EINVAL for consistency
> > > > > >
> > > > > > changes in v7:
> > > > > > - renamed access_t into atype
> > > > > > - allow zero-byte read
> > > > > > - check_mem_access() to the correct offset/size
> > > > > >
> > > > > > new in v6
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > kernel/bpf/btf.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> > > > > > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > > > > index 903719b89238..386300f52b23 100644
> > > > > > --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > > > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > > > > @@ -6443,8 +6443,8 @@ int btf_check_subprog_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
> > > > > > {
> > > > > > struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
> > > > > > struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
> > > > > > + u32 btf_id, max_ctx_offset;
> > > > > > bool is_global;
> > > > > > - u32 btf_id;
> > > > > > int err;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > if (!prog->aux->func_info)
> > > > > > @@ -6457,9 +6457,18 @@ int btf_check_subprog_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
> > > > > > if (prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable)
> > > > > > return -EINVAL;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > + /* subprogs arguments are not actually accessing the data, we need
> > > > > > + * to check for the types if they match.
> > > > > > + * Store the max_ctx_offset and restore it after btf_check_func_arg_match()
> > > > > > + * given that this function will have a side effect of changing it.
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + max_ctx_offset = env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > is_global = prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
> > > > > > err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, btf, btf_id, regs, is_global, 0);
> > > > > >
> > > > > > + env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = max_ctx_offset;
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't understand this.
> > > > > If we pass a ctx into a helper and it's going to
> > > > > access [0..N] bytes from it why do we need to hide it?
> > > > > max_ctx_offset will be used later raw_tp, tp, syscall progs
> > > > > to determine whether it's ok to load them.
> > > > > By hiding the actual size of access somebody can construct
> > > > > a prog that reads out of bounds.
> > > > > How is this related to NULL-ness property?
> > > >
> > > > Same question, was just typing exactly the same thing.
> > >
> > > The test I have that is failing in patch 2/23 is the following, with
> > > args being set to NULL by userspace:
> > >
> > > SEC("syscall")
> > > int kfunc_syscall_test_null(struct syscall_test_args *args)
> > > {
> > > bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, 0);
> > >
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > Basically:
> > > if userspace declares the following:
> > > DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, syscall_topts,
> > > .ctx_in = NULL,
> > > .ctx_size_in = 0,
> > > );
> > >
> > > The verifier is happy with the current released kernel:
> > > kfunc_syscall_test_fail() never dereferences the ctx pointer, it just
> > > passes it around to bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(), which in turn
> > > is also happy because it says it is not accessing the data at all (0
> > > size memory parameter).
> > >
> > > In the current code, check_helper_mem_access() actually returns
> > > -EINVAL, but doesn't change max_ctx_offset (it's still at the value of
> > > 0 here). The program is now marked as unreliable, but the verifier
> > > goes on.
> > >
> > > When adding this patch, if we declare a syscall eBPF (or any other
> > > function that doesn't have env->ops->convert_ctx_access), the previous
> > > "test" is failing because this ensures the syscall program has to have
> > > a valid ctx pointer.
> > > btf_check_func_arg_match() now calls check_mem_access() which
> > > basically validates the fact that the program can dereference the ctx.
> > >
> > > So now, without the max_ctx_offset store/restore, the verifier
> > > enforces that the provided ctx is not null.
> > >
> > > What I thought that would happen was that if we were to pass a NULL
> > > context from userspace, but the eBPF program dereferences it (or in
> > > that case have a subprog or a function call that dereferences it),
> > > then max_ctx_offset would still be set to the proper value because of
> > > that internal dereference, and so the verifier would reject with
> > > -EINVAL the call to the eBPF program.
> > >
> > > If I add another test that has the following ebpf prog (with ctx_in
> > > being set to NULL by the userspace):
> > >
> > > SEC("syscall")
> > > int kfunc_syscall_test_null_fail(struct syscall_test_args *args)
> > > {
> > > bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, sizeof(*args));
> > >
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > Then the call of the program is actually failing with -EINVAL, even
> > > with this patch.
> > >
> > > But again, if setting from userspace a ctx of NULL with a 0 size is
> > > not considered as valid, then we can just drop that hunk and add a
> > > test to enforce it.
> >
> > PTR_TO_CTX in the verifier always means valid pointer.
> > All code paths in the verifier assumes that it's not NULL.
> > Pointer to skb, to xdp, to pt_regs, etc.
> > The syscall prog type is little bit special, since it
> > makes sense not to pass any argument to such prog.
> > So ctx_size_in == 0 is enforced after the verification:
> > if (ctx_size_in < prog->aux->max_ctx_offset ||
> > ctx_size_in > U16_MAX)
> > return -EINVAL;
> > The verifier should be able to proceed assuming ctx != NULL
> > and remember max max_ctx_offset.
> > If max_ctx_offset == 4 and ctx_size_in == 0 then
> > it doesn't matter whether the actual 'ctx' pointer is NULL
> > or points to a valid memory.
> > So it's ok for the verifier to assume ctx != NULL everywhere.
>
> Ok, thanks for the detailed explanation.
>
> >
> > Back to the issue at hand.
> > With this patch the line:
> > bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, sizeof(*args));
> > will be seen as access_size == sizeof(*args), right?
> > So this part:
> > + if (access_size == 0)
> > + return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
> >
> > will be skipped and
> > the newly added check_mem_access() will call check_ctx_access()
> > which will call syscall_prog_is_valid_access() and it will say
> > that any off < U16_MAX is fine and will simply
> > record max max_ctx_offset.
> > The ctx_size_in < prog->aux->max_ctx_offset check is done later.
>
> Yep, this is correct and this is working now, with a proper error (and
> no, this is not the error I am trying to fix, see below):
>
> eBPF prog:
> ```
> SEC("?syscall")
> int kfunc_syscall_test_null_fail(struct syscall_test_args *args)
> {
> bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, sizeof(*args));
> return 0;
> }
> ```
>
> before this patch (1/23):
> * with ctx not NULL:
> libbpf: prog 'kfunc_syscall_test_null_fail': BPF program load failed:
> Invalid argument
> R1 type=ctx expected=fp
> arg#0 arg#1 memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access
>
> => this is not correct, we expect the program to be loaded (and it is
> expected, this is the bug that is fixed)
>
> * Same result with ctx being NULL from the caller
>
> With just the hunk in kernel/bpf/verifier.c (so without touching max_ctx_offset:
> * with ctx not NULL:
> program is loaded, and executed correctly
>
> * with ctx being NULL:
> program is now loaded, but execution returns -EINVAL, as expected
>
> So this case is fully solved by just the hunk in verifier.c
>
> With the full patch:
> same results, with or without ctx being set to NULL, so no side effects.
>
> >
> > So when you're saying:
> > "call of the program is actually failing with -EINVAL"
> > that's the check you're referring to?
>
> No. I am referring to the following eBPF program:
> ```
> SEC("syscall")
> int kfunc_syscall_test_null(struct syscall_test_args *args)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> ```
>
> (no calls, just the declaration of a program)
>
> This one is supposed to be loaded and properly run whatever the
> context is, right?
Got it. Yes. Indeed.
The if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access)
hunk alone would break existing progs because of
side effect of max_ctx_offset.
We have this unfortunate bit of code:
ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
/* unlikely verifier bug. abort.
* ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for
* main() function due to backward compatibility.
* Like socket filter program may be written as:
* int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
* and never dereference that ctx in the program.
* 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket
* filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'.
*/
goto out;
because btf_check_subprog_arg_match() is used to match arguments
for calling into a function and when the verifier just starts
to analyze a function.
Before this patch the btf_check_subprog_arg_match() would just
EINVAL on your above example and will proceed,
but with the patch the non zero max_ctx_offset will
disallow execution later and break things.
I think we need to clean up this bit of code.
Just save/restore of max_ctx_offset isn't going to work.
How about adding a flag to btf_check_subprog_arg_match
to indicate whether the verifier is processing 'call' insn
or just starting processing a function body and
then do
if (ptr_to_mem_ok && processing_call) ?
Still feels like a hack.
Maybe btf_check_func_arg_match() needs to be split to
disambiguate calling vs processing the body ?
And may cleanup the rest of that function ?
Like all of if (is_kfunc) applies only to 'calling' case.
Other ideas?
