On Fri, Aug 26, 2022 at 3:51 AM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
<memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 26 Aug 2022 at 03:42, Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 6:41 AM Benjamin Tissoires
> > <benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > When a function was trying to access data from context in a syscall eBPF
> > > program, the verifier was rejecting the call unless it was accessing the
> > > first element.
> > > This is because the syscall context is not known at compile time, and
> > > so we need to check this when actually accessing it.
> > >
> > > Check for the valid memory access if there is no convert_ctx callback,
> > > and allow such situation to happen.
> > >
> > > There is a slight hiccup with subprogs. btf_check_subprog_arg_match()
> > > will check that the types are matching, which is a good thing, but to
> > > have an accurate result, it hides the fact that the context register may
> > > be null. This makes env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset being set to the size
> > > of the context, which is incompatible with a NULL context.
> > >
> > > Solve that last problem by storing max_ctx_offset before the type check
> > > and restoring it after.
> > >
> > > Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > ---
> > >
> > > changes in v9:
> > > - rewrote the commit title and description
> > > - made it so all functions can make use of context even if there is
> > > no convert_ctx
> > > - remove the is_kfunc field in bpf_call_arg_meta
> > >
> > > changes in v8:
> > > - fixup comment
> > > - return -EACCESS instead of -EINVAL for consistency
> > >
> > > changes in v7:
> > > - renamed access_t into atype
> > > - allow zero-byte read
> > > - check_mem_access() to the correct offset/size
> > >
> > > new in v6
> > > ---
> > > kernel/bpf/btf.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> > > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > index 903719b89238..386300f52b23 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> > > @@ -6443,8 +6443,8 @@ int btf_check_subprog_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
> > > {
> > > struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
> > > struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
> > > + u32 btf_id, max_ctx_offset;
> > > bool is_global;
> > > - u32 btf_id;
> > > int err;
> > >
> > > if (!prog->aux->func_info)
> > > @@ -6457,9 +6457,18 @@ int btf_check_subprog_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
> > > if (prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable)
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > + /* subprogs arguments are not actually accessing the data, we need
> > > + * to check for the types if they match.
> > > + * Store the max_ctx_offset and restore it after btf_check_func_arg_match()
> > > + * given that this function will have a side effect of changing it.
> > > + */
> > > + max_ctx_offset = env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset;
> > > +
> > > is_global = prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
> > > err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, btf, btf_id, regs, is_global, 0);
> > >
> > > + env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = max_ctx_offset;
> >
> > I don't understand this.
> > If we pass a ctx into a helper and it's going to
> > access [0..N] bytes from it why do we need to hide it?
> > max_ctx_offset will be used later raw_tp, tp, syscall progs
> > to determine whether it's ok to load them.
> > By hiding the actual size of access somebody can construct
> > a prog that reads out of bounds.
> > How is this related to NULL-ness property?
>
> Same question, was just typing exactly the same thing.
The test I have that is failing in patch 2/23 is the following, with
args being set to NULL by userspace:
SEC("syscall")
int kfunc_syscall_test_null(struct syscall_test_args *args)
{
bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, 0);
return 0;
}
Basically:
if userspace declares the following:
DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, syscall_topts,
.ctx_in = NULL,
.ctx_size_in = 0,
);
The verifier is happy with the current released kernel:
kfunc_syscall_test_fail() never dereferences the ctx pointer, it just
passes it around to bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(), which in turn
is also happy because it says it is not accessing the data at all (0
size memory parameter).
In the current code, check_helper_mem_access() actually returns
-EINVAL, but doesn't change max_ctx_offset (it's still at the value of
0 here). The program is now marked as unreliable, but the verifier
goes on.
When adding this patch, if we declare a syscall eBPF (or any other
function that doesn't have env->ops->convert_ctx_access), the previous
"test" is failing because this ensures the syscall program has to have
a valid ctx pointer.
btf_check_func_arg_match() now calls check_mem_access() which
basically validates the fact that the program can dereference the ctx.
So now, without the max_ctx_offset store/restore, the verifier
enforces that the provided ctx is not null.
What I thought that would happen was that if we were to pass a NULL
context from userspace, but the eBPF program dereferences it (or in
that case have a subprog or a function call that dereferences it),
then max_ctx_offset would still be set to the proper value because of
that internal dereference, and so the verifier would reject with
-EINVAL the call to the eBPF program.
If I add another test that has the following ebpf prog (with ctx_in
being set to NULL by the userspace):
SEC("syscall")
int kfunc_syscall_test_null_fail(struct syscall_test_args *args)
{
bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1(args, sizeof(*args));
return 0;
}
Then the call of the program is actually failing with -EINVAL, even
with this patch.
But again, if setting from userspace a ctx of NULL with a 0 size is
not considered as valid, then we can just drop that hunk and add a
test to enforce it.
Cheers,
Benjamin
>
> >
> > > +
> > > /* Compiler optimizations can remove arguments from static functions
> > > * or mismatched type can be passed into a global function.
> > > * In such cases mark the function as unreliable from BTF point of view.
> > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > index 2c1f8069f7b7..d694f43ab911 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > @@ -5229,6 +5229,25 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
> > > env,
> > > regno, reg->off, access_size,
> > > zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
> > > + case PTR_TO_CTX:
> > > + /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context,
> > > + * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we
> > > + * can not statically check its size.
> > > + * Dynamically check it now.
> > > + */
> > > + if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) {
> > > + enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ;
> > > + int offset = access_size - 1;
> > > +
> > > + /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */
> > > + if (access_size == 0)
> > > + return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
> > > +
> > > + return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B,
> > > + atype, -1, false);
> > > + }
> >
> > This part looks good alone. Without max_ctx_offset save/restore.
>
> +1, save/restore would be incorrect.
>
