On 6/30/2022 3:23 PM, KP Singh wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 6:10 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 6/30/2022 6:47 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 03:29:53PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 3:26 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 02:21:56PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 1:45 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 08:02:50PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 2:56 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xattr.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +SEC("lsm.s/bprm_committed_creds")
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +void BPF_PROG(bprm_cc, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + struct task_struct *current = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + char dir_xattr_value[64] = {0};
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + int xattr_sz = 0;
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + xattr_sz = bpf_getxattr(bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, XATTR_NAME,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> + dir_xattr_value, 64);
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yeah, this isn't right. You're not accounting for the caller's userns
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor for the idmapped mount. If this is supposed to work you will need a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> variant of vfs_getxattr() that takes the mount's idmapping into account
>>>>>>>>>>>>> afaict. See what needs to happen after do_getxattr().
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for taking a look.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That will not be correct.
>>>>>>>>>>> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user checking current_user_ns()
>>>>>>>>>>> is checking random tasks that happen to be running
>>>>>>>>>>> when lsm hook got invoked.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> KP,
>>>>>>>>>>> we probably have to document clearly that neither 'current*'
>>>>>>>>>>> should not be used here.
>>>>>>>>>>> xattr_permission also makes little sense in this context.
>>>>>>>>>>> If anything it can be a different kfunc if there is a use case,
>>>>>>>>>>> but I don't see it yet.
>>>>>>>>>>> bpf-lsm prog calling __vfs_getxattr is just like other lsm-s that
>>>>>>>>>>> call it directly. It's the kernel that is doing its security thing.
>>>>>>>>>> Right, but LSMs usually only retrieve their own xattr namespace (ima,
>>>>>>>>>> selinux, smack) or they calculate hashes for xattrs based on the raw
>>>>>>>>>> filesystem xattr values (evm).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But this new bpf_getxattr() is different. It allows to retrieve _any_
>>>>>>>>>> xattr in any security hook it can be attached to. So someone can write a
>>>>>>>>>> bpf program that retrieves filesystem capabilites or posix acls. And
>>>>>>>>>> these are xattrs that require higher-level vfs involvement to be
>>>>>>>>>> sensible in most contexts.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This hooks a bpf-lsm program to the security_bprm_committed_creds()
>>>>>>>>>> hook. It then retrieves the extended attributes of the file to be
>>>>>>>>>> executed. The hook currently always retrieves the raw filesystem values.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But for example any XATTR_NAME_CAPS filesystem capabilities that
>>>>>>>>>> might've been stored will be taken into account during exec. And both
>>>>>>>>>> the idmapping of the mount and the caller matter when determing whether
>>>>>>>>>> they are used or not.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But the current implementation of bpf_getxattr() just ignores both. It
>>>>>>>>>> will always retrieve the raw filesystem values. So if one invokes this
>>>>>>>>>> hook they're not actually retrieving the values as they are seen by
>>>>>>>>>> fs/exec.c. And I'm wondering why that is ok? And even if this is ok for
>>>>>>>>>> some use-cases it might very well become a security issue in others if
>>>>>>>>>> access decisions are always based on the raw values.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'm not well-versed in this so bear with me, please.
>>>>>>>>> If this is really just about retrieving the "security.bpf" xattr and no
>>>>>>>>> other xattr then the bpf_getxattr() variant should somehow hard-code
>>>>>>>>> that to ensure that no other xattrs can be retrieved, imho.
>>>>>>>> All of these restrictions look very artificial to me.
>>>>>>>> Especially the part "might very well become a security issue"
>>>>>>>> just doesn't click.
>>>>>>>> We're talking about bpf-lsm progs here that implement security.
>>>>>>>> Can somebody implement a poor bpf-lsm that doesn't enforce
>>>>>>>> any actual security? Sure. It's a code.
>>>>>>> The point is that with the current implementation of bpf_getxattr() you
>>>>>>> are able to retrieve any xattrs and we have way less control over a
>>>>>>> bpf-lsm program than we do over selinux which a simple git grep
>>>>>>> __vfs_getxattr() is all we need.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The thing is that with bpf_getxattr() as it stands it is currently
>>>>>>> impossible to retrieve xattr values - specifically filesystem
>>>>>>> capabilities and posix acls - and see them exactly like the code you're
>>>>>>> trying to supervise is. And that seems very strange from a security
>>>>>>> perspective. So if someone were to write
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SEC("lsm.s/bprm_creds_from_file")
>>>>>>> void BPF_PROG(bprm_cc, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>> struct task_struct *current = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> xattr_sz = bpf_getxattr(bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
>>>>>>> bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode,
>>>>>>> XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, ..);
>>>>>>> // or
>>>>>>> xattr_sz = bpf_getxattr(bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
>>>>>>> bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode,
>>>>>>> XATTR_NAME_CAPS, ..);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> they'd get the raw nscaps and the raw xattrs back. But now, as just a
>>>>>>> tiny example, the nscaps->rootuid and the ->e_id fields in the posix
>>>>>>> ACLs make zero sense in this context.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And what's more there's no way for the bpf-lsm program to turn them into
>>>>>>> something that makes sense in the context of the hook they are retrieved
>>>>>>> in. It lacks all the necessary helpers to do so afaict.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No one complains about the usage of EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_getxattr)
>>>>>>>> in the existing LSMs like selinux.
>>>>>>> Selinux only cares about its own xattr namespace. It doesn't retrieve
>>>>>>> fscaps or posix acls and it's not possible to write selinux programs
>>>>>>> that do so. With the bpf-lsm that's very much possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And if we'd notice selinux would start retrieving random xattrs we'd ask
>>>>>>> the same questions we do here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No one complains about its usage in out of tree LSMs.
>>>>>>>> Is that a security issue? Of course not.
>>>>>>>> __vfs_getxattr is a kernel mechanism that LSMs use to implement
>>>>>>>> the security features they need.
>>>>>>>> __vfs_getxattr as kfunc here is pretty much the same as EXPORT_SYMBOL
>>>>>>>> with a big difference that it's EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL.
>>>>>>>> BPF land doesn't have an equivalent of non-gpl export and is not going
>>>>>>>> to get one.
>>>>>> I want to reiterate what Alexei is saying here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Please* consider this as a simple wrapper around __vfs_getxattr
>>>>>> with a limited attach surface and extra verification checks and
>>>>>> and nothing else.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you are saying is __vfs_getxattr does not make sense in some
>>>>>> contexts. But kernel modules can still use it right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The user is implementing an LSM, if they chose to do things that don't make
>>>>>> sense, then they can surely cause a lot more harm:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> SEC("lsm/bprm_check_security")
>>>>>> int BPF_PROG(bprm_check, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> return -EPERM;
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This discussion would probably be a lot shorter if this series were sent
>>>>>>> with a proper explanation of how this supposed to work and what it's
>>>>>>> used for.
>>>>>> It's currently scoped to BPF LSM (albeit limited to LSM for now)
>>>>>> but it won't just be used in LSM programs but some (allow-listed)
>>>>>> tracing programs too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We want to leave the flexibility to the implementer of the LSM hooks. If the
>>>>>> implementer choses to retrieve posix_acl_* we can also expose
>>>>>> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user or a different kfunc that adds this logic too
>>>>>> but that would be a separate kfunc (and a separate use-case).
>>>>> No, sorry. That's what I feared and that's why I think this low-level
>>>>> exposure of __vfs_getxattr() is wrong:
>>>>> The posix_acl_fix_xattr_*() helpers, as well as the helpers like
>>>>> get_file_caps() will not be exported. We're not going to export that
>>>> I don't want to expose them and I don't want any others to be
>>>> exposed either.
>>>>
>>>>> deeply internal vfs machinery. So I would NACK that. If you want that -
>>>>> and that's what I'm saying here - you need to encapsulate this into your
>>>>> vfs_*xattr() helper that you can call from your kfuncs.
>>>> It seems like __vfs_getxattr is already exposed and does the wrong thing in
>>>> some contexts, why can't we just "fix" __vfs_getxattr then?
>>> To me having either a version of bpf_getxattr() that restricts access to
>>> certain xattrs or a version that takes care to perform the neccesary
>>> translations is what seems to make the most sense. I suggested that in
>>> one of my first mails.
>>>
>>> The one thing where the way the xattrs are retrieved really matters is
>>> for vfscaps (see get_vfs_caps_from_disk()) you really need something
>>> like that function in order for vfs caps to make any sense and be
>>> interpretable by the user of the hook.
>>>
>>> But again, I might just misunderstand the context here and for the
>>> bpf-lsm all of this isn't really a concern. If your new series comes out
>>> I'll try to get more into the wider context.
>>> If the security folks are happy with this then I won't argue.
>> A security module (BPF) using another security module's (Smack)
>> xattrs without that module's (Smack) explicit approval would be
>> considered extremely rude. Smack and SELinux use published interfaces
>> of the capability security module, but never access the capability
>> attributes directly. The details of a security module's implementation
>> are not a factor. The fact that BPF uses loadable programs as opposed
>> to loadable policy is not relevant. The only security.xattr values
>> that the BPF security module should allow the programs it runs to
>> access are the ones it is managing. If you decided to create an eBPF
> What about kernel modules who can use __vfs_getxattr already as
> it's an exported symbol? This can still end up influencing
> security policy or using them in any way they like.
If I put code in Smack to read SELinux attributes I would expect
to get a possibly polite but definitely strongly worded email
from Paul Moore regarding that behavior. The integrity subsystem
looks at Smack and SELinux attributes, but that's upstream and
we can see what nefarious things are being done with them. Because
I can see the upstream kernel code I can convince myself that
regardless of the SELinux policy loaded SELinux isn't going to
muck with the Smack attributes. I can't say the same for eBPF
programs that aren't going to be in Linus' tree.
> Anyways, I think, for now, for the use case we have, it can work with
> a restriction to security.bpf xattrs.
I can't say that this whole discussion is making me feel better
about the BPF LSM concept. The approval was based on the notion
that eBPF programs were restricted to "safe" behavior. It's
hard to see how allowing access to security.selinux could be
guaranteed to be in support of safe behavior.
