On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 2:56 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 10:11:19AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 03:28:42PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 10:52 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 7:33 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 04:19:48PM +0000, KP Singh wrote:
> > > > > > A simple test that adds an xattr on a copied /bin/ls and reads it back
> > > > > > when the copied ls is executed.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xattr.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > >
> > > > [...]
> > > >
> > > > > > +SEC("lsm.s/bprm_committed_creds")
> > > > > > +void BPF_PROG(bprm_cc, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + struct task_struct *current = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
> > > > > > + char dir_xattr_value[64] = {0};
> > > > > > + int xattr_sz = 0;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + xattr_sz = bpf_getxattr(bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
> > > > > > + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, XATTR_NAME,
> > > > > > + dir_xattr_value, 64);
> > > > >
> > > > > Yeah, this isn't right. You're not accounting for the caller's userns
> > > > > nor for the idmapped mount. If this is supposed to work you will need a
> > > > > variant of vfs_getxattr() that takes the mount's idmapping into account
> > > > > afaict. See what needs to happen after do_getxattr().
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for taking a look.
> > > >
> > > > So, If I understand correctly, we don't need xattr_permission (and
> > > > other checks in
> > > > vfs_getxattr) here as the BPF programs run as CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > > >
> > > > but...
> > > >
> > > > So, Is this bit what's missing then?
> > > >
> > > > error = vfs_getxattr(mnt_userns, d, kname, ctx->kvalue, ctx->size);
> > > > if (error > 0) {
> > > > if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
> > > > (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
> > > > posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(mnt_userns, d_inode(d),
> > > > ctx->kvalue, error);
> > >
> > > That will not be correct.
> > > posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user checking current_user_ns()
> > > is checking random tasks that happen to be running
> > > when lsm hook got invoked.
> > >
> > > KP,
> > > we probably have to document clearly that neither 'current*'
> > > should not be used here.
> > > xattr_permission also makes little sense in this context.
> > > If anything it can be a different kfunc if there is a use case,
> > > but I don't see it yet.
> > > bpf-lsm prog calling __vfs_getxattr is just like other lsm-s that
> > > call it directly. It's the kernel that is doing its security thing.
> >
> > Right, but LSMs usually only retrieve their own xattr namespace (ima,
> > selinux, smack) or they calculate hashes for xattrs based on the raw
> > filesystem xattr values (evm).
> >
> > But this new bpf_getxattr() is different. It allows to retrieve _any_
> > xattr in any security hook it can be attached to. So someone can write a
> > bpf program that retrieves filesystem capabilites or posix acls. And
> > these are xattrs that require higher-level vfs involvement to be
> > sensible in most contexts.
> >
> > So looking at:
> >
> > SEC("lsm.s/bprm_committed_creds")
> > void BPF_PROG(bprm_cc, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > {
> > struct task_struct *current = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
> > char dir_xattr_value[64] = {0};
> > int xattr_sz = 0;
> >
> > xattr_sz = bpf_getxattr(bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
> > bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, XATTR_NAME,
> > dir_xattr_value, 64);
> >
> > if (xattr_sz <= 0)
> > return;
> >
> > if (!bpf_strncmp(dir_xattr_value, sizeof(XATTR_VALUE), XATTR_VALUE))
> > result = 1;
> > }
> >
> > This hooks a bpf-lsm program to the security_bprm_committed_creds()
> > hook. It then retrieves the extended attributes of the file to be
> > executed. The hook currently always retrieves the raw filesystem values.
> >
> > But for example any XATTR_NAME_CAPS filesystem capabilities that
> > might've been stored will be taken into account during exec. And both
> > the idmapping of the mount and the caller matter when determing whether
> > they are used or not.
> >
> > But the current implementation of bpf_getxattr() just ignores both. It
> > will always retrieve the raw filesystem values. So if one invokes this
> > hook they're not actually retrieving the values as they are seen by
> > fs/exec.c. And I'm wondering why that is ok? And even if this is ok for
> > some use-cases it might very well become a security issue in others if
> > access decisions are always based on the raw values.
> >
> > I'm not well-versed in this so bear with me, please.
>
> If this is really just about retrieving the "security.bpf" xattr and no
> other xattr then the bpf_getxattr() variant should somehow hard-code
> that to ensure that no other xattrs can be retrieved, imho.
All of these restrictions look very artificial to me.
Especially the part "might very well become a security issue"
just doesn't click.
We're talking about bpf-lsm progs here that implement security.
Can somebody implement a poor bpf-lsm that doesn't enforce
any actual security? Sure. It's a code.
No one complains about the usage of EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_getxattr)
in the existing LSMs like selinux.
No one complains about its usage in out of tree LSMs.
Is that a security issue? Of course not.
__vfs_getxattr is a kernel mechanism that LSMs use to implement
the security features they need.
__vfs_getxattr as kfunc here is pretty much the same as EXPORT_SYMBOL
with a big difference that it's EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL.
BPF land doesn't have an equivalent of non-gpl export and is not going
to get one.
