On Fri, Apr 8, 2022 at 11:29 PM Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9.04.22 г. 1:58 ч., Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 6, 2022 at 5:12 PM Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> I get a validator error with the following function:
> >>
> >> #define MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE (1<<15)
> >> #define PATH_MAX 4096
> >> #define MAX_PATH_COMPONENTS 20
> >> #define IDX(x) ((x) & (MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE-1))
> >>
> >> struct buf_t {
> >> u8 buf[MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE];
> >> };
> >>
> >> struct {
> >> __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY);
> >> __uint(max_entries, 1);
> >> __type(key, u32);
> >> __type(value, struct buf_t);
> >> } buf_map SEC(".maps");
> >>
> >> static __always_inline u32 get_dentry_path_str(struct dentry* dentry,
> >> struct buf_t *string_p)
> >> {
> >> const char slash = '/';
> >> const int zero = 0;
> >>
> >> u32 buf_off = MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1;
> >>
> >> #pragma unroll
> >> for (int i = 0; i < MAX_PATH_COMPONENTS; i++) {
> >> struct dentry *d_parent = BPF_CORE_READ(dentry, d_parent);
> >> if (dentry == d_parent) {
> >> break;
> >> }
> >> // Add this dentry name to path
> >> struct qstr d_name = BPF_CORE_READ(dentry, d_name);
> >> // Ensure path is no longer than PATH_MAX-1 and copy the terminating NULL
> >> unsigned int len = (d_name.len+1) & (PATH_MAX-1);
> >> // Start writing from the end of the buffer
> >> unsigned int off = buf_off - len;
> >> // Is string buffer big enough for dentry name?
> >> int sz = 0;
> >> // verify no wrap occurred
> >> if (off <= buf_off)
> >> sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
> >> else
> >> break;
> >>
> >> if (sz > 1) {
> >> buf_off -= 1; // replace null byte termination with slash sign
> >> bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[IDX(buf_off)]), 1, &slash);
> >> buf_off -= sz - 1;
Isn't it (theoretically) possible for this to underflow? What happens if
sz > 1 and sz >= buf_off?
> >> } else {
> >> // If sz is 0 or 1 we have an error (path can't be null nor an empty string)
> >> break;
> >> }
> >> dentry = d_parent;
> >> }
> >>
> >> // Add leading slash
> >> buf_off -= 1;
> >> bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[IDX(buf_off)]), 1, &slash);
> >> // Null terminate the path string, this replaces the final / with a null
> >> // char
> >> bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE-1]), 1, &zero);
> >> return buf_off;
> >> }
> >>
> >> Here are the last couple of instructions where off is being calculated.
> >>
> >> ; unsigned int len = (d_name.len+1) & (PATH_MAX-1);
> >> 54: (57) r9 &= 4095 ; R9_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
> >> ; unsigned int off = buf_off - len;
> >> 55: (bf) r8 = r9 ; R8_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff)) R9_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
> >> 56: (a7) r8 ^= 32767 ; R8_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
> >> ; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
> >> 57: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -72) ; R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,imm=0) R10=fp0
> >> 58: (0f) r6 += r8 ; R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff)) R8_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
> >> ; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
> >> 59: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) ; R1_w=fp-24 R3_w=inv(id=0)
> >> ; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
> >> 60: (bf) r1 = r6 ; R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff)) R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
> >> 61: (bf) r2 = r9 ; R2_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff)) R9_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
> >> 62: (85) call bpf_probe_read_kernel_str#115
> >> invalid access to map value, value_size=32768 off=32767 size=4095
> >> R1 max value is outside of the allowed memory range
> >>
> >>
> >> From what I gathered it seems that in the bpf_probe_read_kernel_str the validator is not
> >> able to prove that off+len is always going to be at most MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1 which is well within
> >> the bounds of the buffer. My logic goes as following:
> >>
> >> buf_off is first set to 32767, we get the first dentry and calculate its len + null terminating char which is going to be at most
> >> 4095, afterwards 'off' is being calculated as buf_off - len and finally access to the percpu array is performed via IDX(off) which guarantees the access is
> >> bounded by MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1.
> >
> > IDX(off) is bounded, but verifier needs to be sure that `off + len`
> > never goes beyond map value. so you should make sure and prove off <=
> > MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - PATH_MAX. Verifier actually caught a real bug for
>
> But that is guaranteed since off = buff_off - len, and buf_off is
> guaranteed to be at most MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE -1, meaning off is in the
> worst case MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - len so the map value access can't go
> beyond the end ?
>
If there's underflow in the calculation of buff_off (see above) then
buff_off > MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1. Which makes off no longer bounded by
MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - len, and it could exceed MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE.
> > you.
> >
> >>
> >> This code was originally based off https://github.com/aquasecurity/tracee/blob/main/pkg/ebpf/c/tracee.bpf.c#L1721-L1777 however it seems
> >> that the way tracee author work around this is to simply start from the middle of the buffer, i.e set buf_off initially to MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE>>1 and adjust the
> >> array accesses accordingly when doing the masking.
> >
