Re: Error validating array access

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On 9.04.22 г. 1:58 ч., Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
On Wed, Apr 6, 2022 at 5:12 PM Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

Hello,

I get a validator error with the following function:

#define MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE (1<<15)
#define PATH_MAX 4096
#define MAX_PATH_COMPONENTS 20
#define IDX(x) ((x) & (MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE-1))

struct buf_t {
      u8 buf[MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE];
};

struct {
      __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY);
      __uint(max_entries, 1);
      __type(key, u32);
      __type(value, struct buf_t);
} buf_map SEC(".maps");

static __always_inline u32 get_dentry_path_str(struct dentry* dentry,
          struct buf_t *string_p)
{
      const char slash = '/';
      const int zero = 0;

      u32 buf_off = MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1;

      #pragma unroll
      for (int i = 0; i < MAX_PATH_COMPONENTS; i++) {
          struct dentry *d_parent = BPF_CORE_READ(dentry, d_parent);
          if (dentry == d_parent) {
              break;
          }
          // Add this dentry name to path
          struct qstr d_name = BPF_CORE_READ(dentry, d_name);
          // Ensure path is no longer than PATH_MAX-1 and copy the terminating NULL
          unsigned int len = (d_name.len+1) & (PATH_MAX-1);
          // Start writing from the end of the buffer
          unsigned int off = buf_off - len;
          // Is string buffer big enough for dentry name?
          int sz = 0;
          // verify no wrap occurred
          if (off <= buf_off)
              sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
          else
              break;

          if (sz > 1) {
              buf_off -= 1; // replace null byte termination with slash sign
              bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[IDX(buf_off)]), 1, &slash);
              buf_off -= sz - 1;
          } else {
              // If sz is 0 or 1 we have an error (path can't be null nor an empty string)
              break;
          }
          dentry = d_parent;
      }

      // Add leading slash
      buf_off -= 1;
      bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[IDX(buf_off)]), 1, &slash);
      // Null terminate the path string, this replaces the final / with a null
      // char
      bpf_probe_read(&(string_p->buf[MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE-1]), 1, &zero);
      return buf_off;
}

Here are the last couple of instructions where off is being calculated.

; unsigned int len = (d_name.len+1) & (PATH_MAX-1);
54: (57) r9 &= 4095                   ; R9_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
; unsigned int off = buf_off - len;
55: (bf) r8 = r9                      ; R8_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff)) R9_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
56: (a7) r8 ^= 32767                  ; R8_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
57: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -72)       ; R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,imm=0) R10=fp0
58: (0f) r6 += r8                     ; R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff)) R8_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
59: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8)         ; R1_w=fp-24 R3_w=inv(id=0)
; sz = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&string_p->buf[IDX(off)], len, (void *)d_name.name);
60: (bf) r1 = r6                      ; R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff)) R6_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=32768,umin_value=28672,umax_value=32767,var_off=(0x7000; 0xfff))
61: (bf) r2 = r9                      ; R2_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff)) R9_w=inv(id=4,umax_value=4095,var_off=(0x0; 0xfff))
62: (85) call bpf_probe_read_kernel_str#115
invalid access to map value, value_size=32768 off=32767 size=4095
R1 max value is outside of the allowed memory range


  From what I gathered it seems that in the bpf_probe_read_kernel_str the validator is not
able to prove that off+len is always going to be at most MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1 which is well within
the bounds of the buffer. My logic goes as following:

buf_off is first set to 32767, we get the first dentry and calculate its len + null terminating char which is going to be at most
4095, afterwards 'off' is being calculated as buf_off - len and finally access to the percpu array is performed via  IDX(off) which guarantees the access is
bounded by MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - 1.

IDX(off) is bounded, but verifier needs to be sure that `off + len`
never goes beyond map value. so you should make sure and prove off <=
MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - PATH_MAX. Verifier actually caught a real bug for

But that is guaranteed since off = buff_off - len, and buf_off is guaranteed to be at most MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE -1, meaning off is in the worst case MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE - len so the map value access can't go beyond the end ?

you.


This code was originally based off https://github.com/aquasecurity/tracee/blob/main/pkg/ebpf/c/tracee.bpf.c#L1721-L1777 however it seems
that the way tracee author work around this is to simply start from the middle of the buffer, i.e set buf_off initially to MAX_PERCPU_BUFSIZE>>1 and adjust the
array accesses accordingly when doing the masking.




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