On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 20:53 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > >> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > >>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > >>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
> > >>>> {
> > >>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> > >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> > >>>> + int rc;
> > >>>> +
> > >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> > >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> > >>>> + continue;
> > >>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> > >>>> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> > >>>> + if (rc)
> > >>>> + return rc;
> > >>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
> > >>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
> > >>> integrity verification to be skipped.
> > >> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
> > >> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
> > >> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
> > >> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with the
> > >> old style inputs.
> > >>
> > >>> Sample policy rules:
> > >>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
> > >>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
> > > IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
> > > [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
> > > infrastructure supports it.
> >
> > Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
> > case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
>
> From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
> policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
> particular LSM.
If allowing multiple LSMs to define the same label is only an IMA
issue, then have security_audit_rule_init() return the number of LSMs
which define the label. IMA is already emitting a warning when an LSM
rule is not defined. Emitting an additional warning would be the
first step.
In addition, ima_parse_rule() could detect policy rules containing non
LSM specific labels. Based on policy, IMA would decide how to handle
it.
thanks,
Mimi
