On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >>> Hi Casey,
> >>>
> >>> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> >>>> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
> >>>> --- a/security/security.c
> >>>> +++ b/security/security.c
> >>>>
> >>>> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> >>>>
> >>>> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> >>>> {
> >>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >>>> + bool one_is_good = false;
> >>>> + int rc = 0;
> >>>> + int trc;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>>> + continue;
> >>>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> >>>> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >>>> + if (trc == 0)
> >>>> + one_is_good = true;
> >>>> + else
> >>>> + rc = trc;
> >>>> + }
> >>>> + if (one_is_good)
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> + return rc;
> >>>> }
> >>> So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
> >> Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
> >>
> >>>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> >>>> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> >>>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> >>>> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
> >>>> {
> >>>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>>> + continue;
> >>>> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >>>> + }
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>> If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
> >>> I don't understand how this safe.
> >> The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
> >> a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
> >> we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
> >> the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
> >> in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
> > I originally thought loading a new LSM policy could not delete existing
> > LSM labels, but that isn't true. If LSM labels can come and go based
> > on policy, with this code, could loading a new policy for one LSM
> > result in deleting labels of another LSM?
>
> No. I could imagine a situation where changing policy on
> a system where audit rules have been set could result in
> confusion, but that would be true in the single LSM case.
> It would require that secids used in the old policy be
> used for different labels in the new policy. That would
> not be sane behavior. I know it's impossible for Smack.
>
> This is one of the reasons I'm switching from a single secid
> to a collection of secids. You don't want unnatural behavior
> of one LSM to impact the behavior of another.
>
>
> >
> >>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> >>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
> >>>> {
> >>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >>>> + int rc;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>>> + continue;
> >>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> >>>> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >>>> + if (rc)
> >>>> + return rc;
> >>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
> >>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
> >>> integrity verification to be skipped.
> >> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
> >> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
> >> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
> >> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with the
> >> old style inputs.
> >>
> >>> Sample policy rules:
> >>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
> >>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
> > IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
> > [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
> > infrastructure supports it.
>
> Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
> case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
>From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
particular LSM.
>
> >
> >>> Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
> >>> label collision?
> >> What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
> >> to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
> >> valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
Unfortunately, unless audit supports per LSM labels, the infrastructure
needs to detect and prevent the label collision.
> > As this is a runtime issue, when loading a new policy at least flag the
> > collision. When removing the label, when it is defined by multiple
> > LSMs, at least flag the removal.
>
> To what end would the collision be flagged? What would you do with
> the information?
LSM label collision is probably an example of kernel integrity critical
data (yet to be upstreamed).
>
> >
> >>>> + }
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> }
> >>>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
