Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 1/2] bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL

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On Sun, Nov 3, 2024 at 9:01 AM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 10:40, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 10:16, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, 1 Nov 2024 at 17:56, Alexei Starovoitov
> > > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Nov 1, 2024 at 12:16 PM Andrii Nakryiko
> > > > <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > @@ -6693,7 +6709,21 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > > > > >
> > > > > >         if (ret < 0)
> > > > > >                 return ret;
> > > > > > -
> > > > > > +       /* For raw_tp progs, we allow dereference of PTR_MAYBE_NULL
> > > > > > +        * trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID, these are the ones that are possibly
> > > > > > +        * arguments to the raw_tp. Since internal checks in for trusted
> > > > > > +        * reg in check_ptr_to_btf_access would consider PTR_MAYBE_NULL
> > > > > > +        * modifier as problematic, mask it out temporarily for the
> > > > > > +        * check. Don't apply this to pointers with ref_obj_id > 0, as
> > > > > > +        * those won't be raw_tp args.
> > > > > > +        *
> > > > > > +        * We may end up applying this relaxation to other trusted
> > > > > > +        * PTR_TO_BTF_ID with maybe null flag, since we cannot
> > > > > > +        * distinguish PTR_MAYBE_NULL tagged for arguments vs normal
> > > > > > +        * tagging, but that should expand allowed behavior, and not
> > > > > > +        * cause regression for existing behavior.
> > > > > > +        */
> > > > >
> > > > > Yeah, I'm not sure why this has to be raw tp-specific?.. What's wrong
> > > > > with the same behavior for BPF iterator programs, for example?
> > > > >
> > > > > It seems nicer if we can avoid this temporary masking and instead
> > > > > support this as a generic functionality? Or are there complications?
> > > > >
> > >
> > > We _can_ do this for all programs. The thought process here was to
> > > leave existing raw_tp programs unbroken if possible if we're marking
> > > their arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, since most of them won't be
> > > performing any NULL checks at all.
> > >
> > > > > > +       mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg);
> > > > > >         if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
> > > > > >                 /* just mark; */
> > > > > >
> > > > > > @@ -6754,8 +6784,13 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > > > > >                 clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
> > > > > >         }
> > > > > >
> > > > > > -       if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
> > > > > > +       if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
> > > > > >                 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
> > > > > > +               /* We've assigned a new type to regno, so don't undo masking. */
> > > > > > +               if (regno == value_regno)
> > > > > > +                       mask = false;
> > > > > > +       }
> > > > > > +       unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask);
> > > >
> > > > Kumar,
> > > >
> > > > I chatted with Andrii offline. All other cases of mask/unmask
> > > > should probably stay raw_tp specific, but it seems we can make
> > > > this particular case to be generic.
> > > > Something like the following:
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > index 797cf3ed32e0..bbd4c03460e3 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > @@ -6703,7 +6703,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct
> > > > bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > > >                  */
> > > >                 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
> > > >
> > > > +       } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED |
> > > > PTR_MAYBE_NULL)) {
> > > > +                       flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
> > > > +                       goto trusted;
> > > >         } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
> > > > +trusted:
> > > >
> > > > With the idea that trusted_or_null stays that way for all prog
> > > > types and bpf_iter__task->task deref stays trusted_or_null
> > > > instead of being downgraded to ptr_to_btf_id without any flags.
> > > > So progs can do few less != null checks.
> > > > Need to think it through.
> > >
> > > Ok. But don't allow passing such pointers into helpers, right?
> > > We do that for raw_tp to preserve compat, but it would just exacerbate
> > > the issue if we start doing it everywhere.
> > > So it's just that dereferencing a _or_null pointer becomes an ok thing to do?
> > > Let me mull over this for a bit.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure whether not doing the NULL check is better or worse
> > > though. On one hand everything will work without checking for NULL, on
> > > the other hand people may also assume the verifier isn't complaining
> > > because the pointer is valid, and then they read data from the pointer
> > > which always ends up being zero, meaning different things for
> > > different kinds of fields.
> > >
> > > Just thinking out loud, but one of the other concerns would be that
> > > we're encouraging people not to do these NULL checks, which means a
> > > potential page fault penalty everytime that pointer _is_ NULL, instead
> > > of a simple branch, which would certainly be a bit expensive. If this
> > > becomes the common case, I think the prog execution latency penalty
> > > will be big. It is something to consider.
> >
> > Ah, no, my bad, this won't be a problem now, as the JIT does emit a
> > branch to check for kernel addresses, but it probably will be if
> > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619092216.1780946-1-memxor@xxxxxxxxx/
> > gets accepted.
>
> I applied this and tried to find out the time it takes to dereference
> a NULL pointer using bpf_ktime_get_ns
> With the patch above: time=3345 ns
> Without (bpf-next right now): time=170 ns
>
> So I guess that means I should probably drop the patch above if we
> decide to allow dereferencing NULL for all programs.

Your concerns are valid.
Accepting deref of trusted_or_null generically will cause these issues
long term. It's indeed better to make programmers add explicit !=NULL
to their programs.
So scratch my earlier suggestion. Let's keep this patch as-is with special
hack for raw_tp only that we will hopefully resolve later
either with __nullable suffix or compiler detection of nullability.
The latter we discussed briefly with Eduard.
It's doable to teach llvm to emit btf_tag to aid the verifier.
gcc may catch up eventually.





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