Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 1/2] bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL

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On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 5:00 PM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
<memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Arguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the
> semantics that the pointer will be non-NULL.  However, in certain cases,
> a raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL More context about this
> issue is available in [0].
>
> Thus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments
> can actually be NULL, and the verifier's knowledge, that they are never
> NULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such
> pointers potentially crashing the kernel.
>
> To fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special
> case the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow
> passing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp
> programs only. Ensure that we don't do this when ref_obj_id > 0, as in
> that case this is an acquired object and doesn't need such adjustment.
>
> The reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will
> recheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then
> consider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the
> PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.
>
> To allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads
> into trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
>
> While trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs
> where such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will
> tackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can
> already be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they
> are left alone for now.
>
> It is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args
> that are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case,
> allowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so
> won't regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into
> helpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.
>
> Also update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the
> new behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when
> directly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.
>
>   [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> Reported-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: 3f00c5239344 ("bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs")
> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  include/linux/bpf.h                           |  6 ++
>  kernel/bpf/btf.c                              |  5 +-
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         | 75 +++++++++++++++++--
>  .../bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable.c          |  6 +-
>  4 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>

[...]

> @@ -6693,7 +6709,21 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>
>         if (ret < 0)
>                 return ret;
> -
> +       /* For raw_tp progs, we allow dereference of PTR_MAYBE_NULL
> +        * trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID, these are the ones that are possibly
> +        * arguments to the raw_tp. Since internal checks in for trusted
> +        * reg in check_ptr_to_btf_access would consider PTR_MAYBE_NULL
> +        * modifier as problematic, mask it out temporarily for the
> +        * check. Don't apply this to pointers with ref_obj_id > 0, as
> +        * those won't be raw_tp args.
> +        *
> +        * We may end up applying this relaxation to other trusted
> +        * PTR_TO_BTF_ID with maybe null flag, since we cannot
> +        * distinguish PTR_MAYBE_NULL tagged for arguments vs normal
> +        * tagging, but that should expand allowed behavior, and not
> +        * cause regression for existing behavior.
> +        */

Yeah, I'm not sure why this has to be raw tp-specific?.. What's wrong
with the same behavior for BPF iterator programs, for example?

It seems nicer if we can avoid this temporary masking and instead
support this as a generic functionality? Or are there complications?

> +       mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg);
>         if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
>                 /* just mark; */
>
> @@ -6754,8 +6784,13 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>                 clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
>         }
>
> -       if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
> +       if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
>                 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
> +               /* We've assigned a new type to regno, so don't undo masking. */
> +               if (regno == value_regno)
> +                       mask = false;
> +       }
> +       unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask);
>
>         return 0;
>  }

[...]





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