Hello:
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>:
On Fri, 8 Dec 2023 17:09:57 -0800 you wrote:
> When verifier validates BPF_ST_MEM instruction that stores known
> constant to stack (e.g., *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 123), it effectively spills
> a fake register with a constant (but initially imprecise) value to
> a stack slot. Because read-side logic treats it as a proper register
> fill from stack slot, we need to mark such stack slot initialization as
> INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS instruction to stop precision backtracking from
> missing it.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,1/2] bpf: handle fake register spill to stack with BPF_ST_MEM instruction
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/482d548d40b0
- [bpf-next,2/2] selftests/bpf: validate fake register spill/fill precision backtracking logic
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/7d8ed51bcb32
You are awesome, thank you!
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