On Fri, Dec 8, 2023 at 5:41 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 10:52:15AM -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
> > allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
> > program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
> > unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
> > privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
> >
> > This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
> > mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
> > constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
> > previous patch).
> >
> > BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
> > through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
> > FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
> > point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
> > prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
> > having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
> > to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
> > creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
> > further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
> > programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
> >
> > When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
> > BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
> > checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
> > capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
> > capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
> > token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
> >
> > Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
> > functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
> > combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
> > previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
> > it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
> > a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
> > functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
> > And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
> > a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
> > restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
> >
> > Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
> > within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
> > story of BPF token.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
>
> Same concerns as in the other mail. For the bpf_token_create() code,
> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
This patch set has landed in bpf-next and there are a bunch of other
patches after it, so I presume it will be a bit problematic to add ack
after the fact. But thanks for taking another look and acking!
