On Thu, 21 Mar 2019 at 03:03, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 02:09:08AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> > On Tue, 19 Mar 2019 at 22:17, Alexei Starovoitov
> > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 10:20:59AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> > > > Using bpf_skc_lookup_tcp it's possible to ascertain whether a packet
> > > > belongs to a known connection. However, there is one corner case: no
> > > > sockets are created if SYN cookies are active. This means that the final
> > > > ACK in the 3WHS is misclassified.
> > > >
> > > > Using the helper, we can look up the listening socket via
> > > > bpf_skc_lookup_tcp and then check whether a packet is a valid SYN
> > > > cookie ACK.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > > > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 18 +++++++++-
> > > > net/core/filter.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > index 8e4f8276942a..587d7a3295bf 100644
> > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > @@ -2391,6 +2391,21 @@ union bpf_attr {
> > > > * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure.
> > > > * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock**
> > > > * result is from **reuse->socks**\ [] using the hash of the tuple.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * int bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len)
> > > > + * Description
> > > > + * Check whether iph and th contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for
> > > > + * the listening socket in sk.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * iph points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while
> > > > + * iph_len contains sizeof(struct iphdr) or sizeof(struct ip6hdr).
> > > > + *
> > > > + * th points to the start of the TCP header, while th_len contains
> > > > + * sizeof(struct tcphdr).
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Return
> > > > + * 0 if iph and th are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative error
> > > > + * otherwise.
> > > > */
> > > > #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \
> > > > FN(unspec), \
> > > > @@ -2492,7 +2507,8 @@ union bpf_attr {
> > > > FN(tcp_sock), \
> > > > FN(skb_ecn_set_ce), \
> > > > FN(get_listener_sock), \
> > > > - FN(skc_lookup_tcp),
> > > > + FN(skc_lookup_tcp), \
> > > > + FN(tcp_check_syncookie),
> > > >
> > > > /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper
> > > > * function eBPF program intends to call
> > > > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> > > > index f5210773cfd8..45a46fbe4ee0 100644
> > > > --- a/net/core/filter.c
> > > > +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> > > > @@ -5546,6 +5546,74 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce_proto = {
> > > > .ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
> > > > .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
> > > > };
> > > > +
> > > > +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len,
> > > > + struct tcphdr *, th, u32, th_len)
> > >
> > > what was the reason to pass ip and tcp header pointers separately?
> > > Why not to pass 'void* iph' with len long enough to cover both?
> >
> > Our use case is to look at Foo-over-UDP encapsulated packets before they are
> > decapsulated, and if necessary forward them to another machine.
> > Essentially a bit
> > of BPF which either XDP_PASSes when we find that a packet belongs to a known
> > connection, or XDP_TX if it doesn't.
> >
> > This means we already have to have both ip and tcp header parsed,
> > otherwise it can't get a reference to a socket via bpf_skc_lookup_tcp.
> > Giving both pointers
> > to the syncookie helper saves us from doing that work twice.
> >
> > > the helper can compute tcp header and can take into account variable length ipv4 hdr
> > > while checking that resulting ptr is within 'iph + len' validated by the verifier.
> >
> > I guess you're thinking of a use case where ip and tcp are not already
> > parsed in eBPF, like checking
> > tcp_check_syncookie(skb->sk, ...)?
> >
> > For IPv4 this seems straightforward, but for IPv6 I need to skip
> > extension headers.
> > ipv6_skip_exthdr requires an sk_buff, which isn't available when
> > calling from an XDP context.
> > Neither creating an sk_buff ad-hoc, nor duplicating ipv6_skip_exthdr
> > are particularly appealing.
> >
> > Even if I have an skb context, I need to be able to specify at which offset in
> > the skb the TCP/IP header starts, since we're using FoU encapsulation.
> > In this case I also can't
> > use skb->sk, but have to do skc_lookup_tcp, which requires demuxing
> > again (to get a socket tuple).
> > If the helper only takes a single pointer + length, that work is done twice.
> >
> > I think there is a tension here between integrating well with
> > bpf_sock_tuple based APIs and
> > using skb->sk directly. My best attempt at fixing this is
> >
> > bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct sock * sk, void *tcpiph,
> > u32 tcpiph_len, u32 th_off, u64 flags)
> >
> > Where th_off is < tcpiph_len and gives the offset of the tcp header in tcpiph.
> > But using that API seems even more cumbersome? It still requires demux in eBPF
> > and figuring out th_off isn't very natural. It might be possible to
> > allow th_off to be
> > 0 to invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr machinery if there is a way around sk_buff.
> >
> > Alternatively:
> >
> > bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(void *ctx, u32 iph_offset, struct sock * sk, u64 flags)
> >
> > No idea whether this is feasible from XDP (due to sk_buff), and forces
> > duplicate work.
> > It would allow bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(skb, 0, NULL, 0) for checking skb
> > against it skb->skb, which seems nice, but I'm not sure whether it's
> > actually useful.
> >
> > > Last patch example is buggy in that sense, since it's doing:
> > > tcph = data + sizeof(struct ethhdr) + sizeof(struct iphdr);
> >
> > Oops!
> >
> > >
> > > If we drop two args then there will be room for 'flags'.
> > > It can be used for example to indicate whether LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED
> > > should be incremented or not.
> > > May be it shold be unconditionally?
> >
> > No, I think that is only the right thing to do do if a) the packet is
> > destined for the local machine
> > and b) is dropped by BPF as a result of doing the check (otherwise
> > we'd double count).
> >
> > For us, a) isn't necessarily true. For others, knowing to drop in case
> > b) to avoid double counting
> > seems harder than just letting the packet continue up the stack? I
> > guess I'm not exactly clear what
> > the use case could be.
> >
> > I agree that having flags would be good though.
>
> Ok. All makes sense.
>
> Was thinking that something like this should be possible:
> BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph,
> struct tcphdr *, th, u32, th_len, u64, flags)
> and the helper would need to check that th - iph > sizeof(iphdr)
> but that requires some non-trivial verifier hacks.
>
> So please resubmit as-is.
> It doesn't apply cleanly yet.
Sorry about this. It requires Martin KaFai Lau's fix for the
bpf_tcp_sock reference
tracking, since it depends on sk_release on PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON. How do I fix
this for bpf-next?
>
> > > > +#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_IPV6)
> > > > + case AF_INET6:
> > > > + if (unlikely(iph_len < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
> > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > +
> > > > + ret = __cookie_v6_check((struct ipv6hdr *)iph, th, cookie);
> > >
> > > I guess this is fast path and you don't want indirect call via ipv6_bpf_stub ?
> > >
> >
> > We run this on all inbound eyeball traffic, so yes. What is the
> > benefit of going via ipv6_bpf_stub?
>
> to keep this helper working when ipv6 is a module,
> but I very much prefer to kill ipv6-as-module option,
> so IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_IPV6) is fine to me.
>
--
Lorenz Bauer | Systems Engineer
25 Lavington St., London SE1 0NZ
www.cloudflare.com
