Daniel Micay <danielmicay@xxxxxxxxx> on Mon, 2015/01/05 04:01: > On 04/01/15 05:03 PM, Doug Newgard wrote: > > On Sun, 4 Jan 2015 22:05:21 +0100 > > Christian Hesse <list@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > >> Hello everybody, > >> > >> pacman 4.2.0 gained support for verifying source tarballs with > >> kernel.org style signature. Some (even essential) packages could > >> benefit from that, linux and git come to mind. > >> > >> How to handle this? Report a bug for every package? Provide a list > >> here? > > > > A lot of it is already happening: > > https://www.archlinux.org/todo/validpgpkeys-integrity-check/ > > > > If you want it added to a package that isn't on that list, the bug > > tracker is probably the best bet. Note that the linux package already > > has it. > > > > Doug > > That rebuild is just to fix packages that were already using GPG > signatures and need the fingerprint(s) added. There are a lot that could > be using them and aren't yet. This could likely be automated to a large > extent. > > Using a script to detect if HTTPS works for fetching the sources along > with checking for signature files by appending .asc and .sig seems like > a promising plan. I do not think we need HTTPS, though it does not hurt. If anybody tries to fool us with man-in-the-middle via HTTP we should detect that just fine with broken signatures (given signatures are provided...). Appending .sign may help as well. In fact for an example file archive.tar.xz we may want to check for {${FILE},${FILE%.(xz|bz2|gz)}}.{asc,sig,sign} $ export FILE=archive.tar.xz $ echo {${FILE},${FILE%.(xz|bz2|gz)}}.{asc,sig,sign} archive.tar.xz.asc archive.tar.xz.sig archive.tar.xz.sign archive.tar.asc archive.tar.sig archive.tar.sign -- main(a){char*c=/* Schoene Gruesse */"B?IJj;MEH" "CX:;",b;for(a/* Chris get my mail address: */=0;b=c[a++];) putchar(b-1/(/* gcc -o sig sig.c && ./sig */b/42*2-3)*42);}
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