Re: Fwd: Warning from users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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> Date: Tuesday, October 29, 2019 22:03:58 +0000
> From: sebb <sebbaz@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> On Mon, 28 Oct 2019 at 09:19, sebb <sebbaz@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> 
>> On Sun, 27 Oct 2019 at 14:21, Richard
>> <lists-apache@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > > Date: Sunday, October 27, 2019 12:17:36 +0000
>> > > From: sebb <sebbaz@xxxxxxxxx>
>> > > 
>> > >> On Sun, 27 Oct 2019 at 09:32, Richard
>> > >> <lists-apache@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > >> 
>> > >> I agree, there are a range of reasons that a receiving host
>> > >> might reject a message. When you add in DMARC - because the
>> > >> headers aren't rewritten - the chances of rejects, and
>> > >> because of that that someone will get kicked off a list,
>> > >> increase dramatically (at least for those of us whose ESPs
>> > >> enforce DMARC).
>> > >> 
>> > >> Indeed, the headers on that message don't include any DMARC
>> > >> references, and that's the problem. The sender's host/domain
>> > >> (helios.jpl.nasa.gov) has DMARC set to "p=reject":
>> > >> 
>> > >>   dig txt _dmarc.helios.jpl.nasa.gov
>> > >> 
>> > >>   ;; ANSWER SECTION:
>> > >>   _dmarc.helios.jpl.nasa.gov. 569 IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject;
>> > >> 
>> > >> which means that messages that purport to be from that
>> > >> host/domain can't be seen to be being sent from "just
>> > >> anywhere". Because the sender's message was (re-)sent from an
>> > >> "apache.org" domain/IP it failed DMARC which got it rejected
>> > >> from DMARC-enforcing ESPs.
>> > >> 
>> > >> For anyone using a DMARC-enforcing ESP (of which gmail is
>> > >> one), it's fairly routine to get kicked off (or threatened
>> > >> with removal from) lists that don't do the necessary
>> > >> rewriting -- which seems to include most (all?) of the
>> > >> "apache.org" hosted lists.
>> > > 
>> > > I see, thanks for the clear explanation.
>> > > 
>> > > I've just checked the DMARC filter, and whilst it removes the
>> > > DKIM signature, it is also supposed to munge the From line to
>> > > append '.INVALID'.
>> > > 
>> > > This does not appear to have happened.
>> > > 
>> > > The script assumes that the DKIM header comes before the From
>> > > line; maybe that was not the case here.
>> > > 
>> > > I assume the From rewriting is intended to disable the DMARC
>> > > check at the receiving end.
>> > > 
>> > > There are several examples of the From munging on the list,
>> > > e.g.
>> > > 
>> > > http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-users/201910.mb
>> > > ox/%3
>> > > c158c6a04-ef01-2fce-bf33-aabc673bbae1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%3e
>> > > 
>> > 
>> > The '.INVALID' "From" rewrite works, at least with my
>> > DMARC-enforcing ESP, when it's invoked. I got the message you
>> > referenced above, as well as about 20 others, from this list
>> > over the course of the last ~4 months that were munged that way.
>> 
>> Good to know.
>> 
>> > The filter is missing enough, however, that I have been
>> > threatened with expulsion from this list at least once over that
>> > same period (plus 5 times from another ".apache.org" hosted one).
>> 
>> It does look like the filter does not always work correctly.
>> 
>> It would be useful to know which messages and lists are involved.
>> Note that about half apache.org lists use the dmarc filter; the
>> others do not.
>> 
>> I have raised https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/INFRA-19347.
>> 
>> If you could add any relevant details to the issue, that would be
>> great.
> 
> FTR: the email from helios.jpl.nasa.gov does not have an
> Authentication-Results: header in it.
> AFAICT all the other emails with DKIM-Sigs or munged From: headers
> (i.e. they originally had a DKIM header) have an
> Authentication-Results header from one of the spamd MTAs.
> 
> Since the email was definitely seen by spamd3-us-west.apache.org
> this is a bit odd.
> Also the X-Spam-Status header does not mention any DKIM tests.
> 
> This suggests to me that the original email probably did not have a
> DKIM signature in it.
> 

The intent of DMARC is to give domain owners a way to keep people
from spoofing their domain. People who are spoofing an address aren't
likely to sign or otherwise add markers to the message headers
(except to try to get their spoofing through) so I don't believe that
you can count on anything within the message header (including the
lack of a DKIM signature) as definitive that DMARC is or isn't set on
the From: host/domain. I think that the only real test is to do a DNS
query to look up the DMARC settings on the RFC5322 From address:

   <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489>

   1. Domain Owners publish policy assertions about domains
      via the DNS.

   2. Receivers compare the RFC5322.From address in the mail
      to the SPF and DKIM results, if present, and the DMARC
      policy in DNS.

You might want to look at the document at:

<https://gitlab.com/mailman/mailman/blob/master/src/mailman/rules/docs/dmarc-mitigation.rst>

to see the way Mailman appears to be handling this.




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