info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c index ee601d7f0926..c0690d1ecd55 100644 --- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <sound/rawmidi.h> #include <sound/info.h> #include <sound/control.h> @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card, return -ENXIO; if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1) return -EINVAL; + info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2); pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream]; if (pstr->substream_count == 0) return -ENOENT; -- 2.21.0 _______________________________________________ Alsa-devel mailing list Alsa-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://mailman.alsa-project.org/mailman/listinfo/alsa-devel
