Carriers' credit crunch

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Carriers' credit crunch
By Dan Reed, USA TODAY

FORT WORTH =97 As a group, the USA's largest airlines are worthless, and=
 that=20
unusual predicament could help push some of the largest still-solvent=20
carriers into bankruptcy-court protection sooner than most analysts now=20
expect. Collectively, the nation's nine major passenger carriers saw all=20
$15.7 billion of shareholder equity on their books at the end of 2001=20
vanish in 2002. They ended last year with a combined negative shareholder=20
equity of $2 billion =97 the amount by which liabilities exceeded their=20
assets. That figure would be even uglier if the $4.4 billion equity of=20
Southwest Airlines, the only profitable major carrier, were excluded.=20
Investors and Wall Street analysts normally pay little attention to=20
companies' shareholder equity. But coupled with soaring debt levels,=20
dwindling equity means that the airlines have little remaining ability to=20
borrow money to cover their continuing huge losses. Without access to more=
=20
financing, and without big savings from labor and other cost cutting soon,=
=20
they could be forced into bankruptcy reorganization to preserve cash. One=20
pilots union board member at American recently told members his "best=20
guess" was that without significant revenue and cost changes, AMR,=20
American's parent and the world's biggest airline company, would file a=20
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition by "midsummer." Another union official=20
warned that a filing could come by May.

Pessimism rising
That's much sooner than most Wall Street analysts had been saying that AMR,=
=20
or any other still-solvent carrier, could be forced to seek court=20
protection from creditors. But in the past two weeks, even a handful of=20
industry analysts have revised their views to allow for earlier filings, at=
=20
least by AMR. That's without giving any consideration to a war, which could=
=20
worsen the industry's financial situation much faster. Lenders track=20
companies' debt-to-equity ratios closely as an indicator of=20
creditworthiness. Having negative shareholder equity, which makes a=20
company's debt-to-equity ratio impossible to calculate, does not=20
automatically cause a financial crisis at an airline. Northwest was in=20
negative territory for most of the 1990s after a close brush with=20
bankruptcy reorganization in 1993 and is there again today. Yet it=20
generally is regarded as a likely survivor of the current distress. Still,=
=20
when an airline's equity falls below zero, lenders see red flags. In some=20
cases, negative equity can trigger defaults on loan covenants. That=20
typically leads to higher borrowing costs and lenders' insistence that some=
=20
cash be moved into restricted accounts to protect the lenders' interests.=20
Though restricted cash is reported on a company's balance sheet as cash, it=
=20
can't be used to pay for day-to-day expenses such as payroll, rent,=20
utilities and, in the case of airlines, jet fuel.

AMR is a good example. More than $700 million of the $2.7 billion in cash=20
it had at year's end is restricted, meaning AMR ended 2002 with only $2=20
billion of truly available cash. In turn, tougher lending requirements to=20
cure one default =97 or even the mere existence of a default on one loan=20
agreement =97 can sometimes trigger defaults on other loan deals. "If=20
somebody says having negative equity is not a big problem, they may be=20
right in the very short term," says consultant Jon Ash of Global Aviation=20
Associates in Washington, D.C. "But in the long term, it is. Your cost of=20
borrowing goes way up. And if you don't turn it around" and generate=20
profits, or, at the very least, positive cash flow to cover operating=20
financing cost, "pretty soon you'll go (into) Chapter 11."

Deepening problems
In reality, only three of the nine major airlines actually ended 2002 with=
=20
negative equity: UAL and US Airways, both in Chapter 11, along with=20
still-solvent Northwest. Together, they had negative equity of $9.75=20
billion. But at least four others =97 AMR, Delta, Continental and America=20
West =97 are in danger of slipping into negative territory this year. Making=
=20
up shortfalls in pension plans is another worry. Typically, that's done by=
=20
recording a non-cash charge against equity. American took a $1.1 billion=20
charge of that nature in December to cover part of its $3 billion-plus=20
pension plan shortfall. Delta's charge against equity was $700 million last=
=20
year. More charges are likely. Only Southwest and Alaska are likely to end=
=20
2003 with positive equity.

Phil Baggaley, airline debt analyst at Standard & Poor's, who has a "junk"=
=20
credit rating on every major carrier except Southwest, cautions that=20
diminished shareholder equity is one indication of the severity of the=20
airlines' problems but not the only one.
Others include cash flow, cash on hand, undrawn bank lines of credit and=20
assets that can be used as collateral. Unfortunately, most carriers' cash=20
flows are negative. Also, cash losses =97 running at about $20 million a day=
=20
in the first quarter =97 are rapidly depleting cash reserves. Some airlines,=
=20
such as Continental, have drawn down all their available credit while=20
others are having to pay big premiums for continued access to borrowed=20
money. Beyond that, most of their assets =97 mainly jets =97 have been=
 pledged=20
as collateral for other borrowing. For example, AMR said a year ago that it=
=20
had $6 billion in unencumbered aircraft it could put up as collateral. Now,=
=20
that figure is down to $2.9 billion.

But of that, AMR can probably raise only about $700 million from newer jets=
=20
that lenders would be interested in backing. The rest of its jets are older=
=20
models that lenders would be wary of accepting as collateral. What=20
separates this downturn from others is that now airlines are losing the=20
ability to raise money from aircraft they own, says industry consultant Dan=
=20
Kasper of LECG in Cambridge, Mass. "It's the end of the airplane financing=
=20
bubble," he says. "It's a bubble that ran longer than even the dot-com=
 bubble."


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