...and for all these reasons, pilots should not carry guns. It puts the whole airport at risk.
ALPA Critical of TSA Rule for Pilots Carrying Firearms
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 /PRNewswire/ -- The head of the nation's largest pilot
union has told the Transportation Security Administration that the new rule
governing how armed pilots would carry their firearms creates more problems
than it solves.
Responding earlier to a draft of the final rule, Capt. Duane Woerth,
president of the Air Line Pilots Association, said, "We believe that there are
significant security, safety, and liability issues that arise from the TSA's
proposed weapon carriage methodology." In a follow-up communication to
Admiral James Loy, head of TSA, Woerth said that ALPA cannot endorse the
procedure as written.
The requirement that pilots carry the firearm in a lock-box, rather than
in a holster on their person, gives the appearance of providing protection for
the firearm, but in actuality does just the opposite. Law enforcement
officers routinely carry their firearms holstered on their person because that
is the most secure protection against loss or theft while transporting it
during travel.
In arriving at this conclusion, ALPA consulted numerous experts on the use
of firearms in law enforcement. One of them, Wade Jackson, a retired FBI
agent who served for nearly ten years as unit chief of the FBI's firearms
training unit in Quantico, Va., upon hearing of the TSA rule, said "The best
way for a law enforcement officer to ensure the security of his/her duty
weapon is to carry the weapon on their person. A recent audit of FBI lost and
stolen weapons by the DOJ Office of the Inspector General -- an audit which
spanned nearly 30 years -- did not disclose a single incident of theft when
the weapon was secured in a holster, on the person, as FBI policy requires.
The audit also revealed that the vast majority of the weapons were lost or
stolen when they were carried in some other manner, such as in gym bags, hand
bags or briefcases."
Lock-box carriage also raises numerous legal and security issues:
* If the TSA becomes aware that a weapon has been stolen from a Federal
Flight Deck Officer's (FFDO) bag located inside of a secured area, what
actions will be necessary to ensure that the weapon does not pose a hijack
threat to airline operations?
* Will it be necessary to evacuate all people from the air operations
area and/or security identification display area to perform a search for a
weapon that is reported missing? Will both the origin and destination
airports be affected? If the weapon is never found, how will the TSA
determine that the weapon is not within the secured area?
* If an FFDO's weapon is stolen while in the control of the airline and
out of the FFDO's immediate possession, which is liable -- the airline, the
TSA, or both? (This already is a widespread problem for the theft and loss of
ordinary checked luggage of passengers under the post-9/11 security
procedures.)
* If a crime is committed with a weapon stolen while in the control of
the airline, but out of the FFDO's immediate possession, which is liable --
the airline, the TSA, or both?
* What liability does the FFDO face if his or her weapon is stolen while
out of his or her immediate possession and used to commit a crime?
* What provisions has the TSA made to provide an alternate weapon if the
FFDO's firearm is lost or stolen while they are deadheading or commuting and
need the weapon during the remainder of their travels as operating
crewmembers?
The TSA rule also apparently violates a specific provision in the law that
created the FFDO program, requiring training "to ensure that the officer
maintains exclusive control over the officer's firearm at all times ... "
The TSA rule would require an FFDO pilot who is flying as a passenger
(deadheading or commuting) to have the weapon stowed in the cargo hold --
where it would not be under the officer's control.
TSA has indicated that it will review the program after the initial class
of 48 pilot applicants has been trained and deployed and make any necessary
improvements. We are hopeful that by that point the TSA will realize that the
lock-box option is seriously flawed. Failing that, because of the many
concerns over this procedure, ALPA will pursue all options, up to and
including legal and/or legislative action, to correct this problem.
Roger
EWROPS