Re: Pilot's instructions before crash contradicted

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Gerard M Foley wrote:
> Further questions about this collision include asking why the two aircraft
> were cleared into the same airspace at the same altitude at the same time,
> apparently by ATC's of two different nationalities, Italian and
> some other.
> As has been said,  TCAS is not supposed to be the first line of defense
> against collision.

This is like asking why an aircraft approaching US airspace from Mexico and
one heading south from Canada is allowed to be at the same level, although
admittedly the scale is somewhat smaller! The two controllers handing over
the traffic to the Zurich center might not even had known about the other
traffic. Their aircraft are entering another sector (and in this case the
airspace of another country, but that's really not important in this
scenario - it might as well have been two adjacent sectors within the same
Area Control Center) and the person responsible for solving conflicts within
this sector is the controller working this position.
Strips or electronic devices with the same function are normally used to
detect these kinds of conflicts well ahead of time and in a normal scenario,
the controller working the sector would call the previous controller asking
to have one of the aircraft delivered at another level. Obviously this did
not happen in this case, but perhaps the inevstigation will reveal that he
had tried that prior to getting occupied with the phone calls to
Friedrichshafen airport, and perhaps also had failed getting in touch with
his colleagues in Germany or Italy? Perhaps he then decided to solve the
conflict himself once traffic was on his frequency, only to forget about it
when the problems of giving an inbound release to Friedrichshafen stole his
attention. This is of course pure speculatioon, as no details of his work in
the minutes prior to the mid-air has been  released.
But in short: The 'problem' you're raising here is really non-existant, as
any controller or other person with knowledge of the ATC system would tell
you. Nevertheless, it's the sort of 'problem' the general media would like
to do a story about, as it sounds really reckless when presented thsi way,
although it's really perfectly safe when the ATC system works like it's
designed to. Of course the safety of the system could be increased by
applying the 'one flightlevel - one aircraft' principle. That would mean
that approx. 30 aircraft could be flying in US airspace simultaneously - 8
of them within the preferred level bands. The rest would have to stay on the
ground until there was a free level for them. So let's stick to the 'one
flightlevel - multiple aircraft separated by at least 5 nautical miles'
principle, shall we?

Rgds
Jan Broe
EKCH ATC

[Index of Archives]         [NTSB]     [NASA KSC]     [Yosemite]     [Steve's Art]     [Deep Creek Hot Springs]     [NTSB]     [STB]     [Share Photos]     [Yosemite Campsites]