On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:24:44AM +0200, Michal Privoznik wrote:
Now that we have strong PRNG generator implemented in virRandomBytes() let's use that instead of gnulib's random_r. Problem with the latter is in way we seed it: current UNIX time and libvirtd's PID are not that random as one might think. Imagine two hosts booting at the same time. There's a fair chance that those hosts spawn libvirtds at the same time and with the same PID. This will result in both daemons generating the same sequence of say MAC addresses [1]. 1: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvirt-users/2018-May/msg00097.html Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@xxxxxxxxxx> --- src/util/virrandom.c | 63 ++-------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
ACK to patches 1-7. But for this one I'm "concerned" about few things. First of all, just so I don't forget it, random_r can be removed from bootstrap.conf after this patch, right? Before this patch, and without gnutls, we wouldn't deplete the entropy of the kernel, (even though we're just using /dev/urandom and not /dev/random), but now we'd read everything from /dev/urandom. Last but not least, if we completely drop the non-gnutls variants of everything, wouldn't everything be easier anyway? Like the worrying about entropy pool in previous point? And one thing below:
diff --git a/src/util/virrandom.c b/src/util/virrandom.c
index 444b0f9802..01cc82a052 100644
--- a/src/util/virrandom.c
+++ b/src/util/virrandom.c
@@ -108,26 +61,14 @@ VIR_ONCE_GLOBAL_INIT(virRandom)
uint64_t virRandomBits(int nbits)
{
uint64_t ret = 0;
- int32_t bits;
- if (virRandomInitialize() < 0) {
+ if (virRandomBytes((unsigned char *) &ret, sizeof(ret)) < 0) {
/* You're already hosed, so this particular non-random value
* isn't any worse. */
return 0;
We definitely want to return an error here now IMHO.
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