Bruno Wolff III wrote: > On Sat, Apr 26, 2014 at 22:19:47 +0200, > Frantisek Hanzlik <franta@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> I'm not SSL/TLS guru and I'm not in-deep study heartbeat OpenSSL bug >> (mainly because I consider Fedora 15+ as too problematic and stay at >> F14 with eventual migration to CentOS 6 on my servers, thus they aren't >> affected with this bug), but - it is truth, that when private key is >> stealed, this _always_ implied, that encrypted traffic may be read >> with private key knowledge? As I know, when e.g. Diffie-Hellman key >> exchanging is used, then either private key knowledge isn't sufficient >> to decode network traffic. Of course, TLS RFCs give us some basic set >> of mandatory ciphersuites which should know every TLS endpoint, and >> there are also these, where private key knowledge is sufficient for >> traffic decoding. But when at my side I allow e.g. (contrary to RFCs) >> only DH ciphersuites, then maybe either I'm not able establish a >> connection, or my connection is reliable - although connection is >> tapped by someone, who keep my private key. Or am I wrong? > > If you have the private key and can redirect network traffic you can do > man in the middle attacks. If forward security isn't being provided then > just being able to see the traffic can allow you to get session keys. MITM I can do even without having victims private key, it is another case. But what I want to say, that was that even private key knowledge is not _always_ sufficient to decode TLS traffic (when I able see / capture it). -- Franta Hanzlik -- users mailing list users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change subscription options: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/users Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines Have a question? Ask away: http://ask.fedoraproject.org
