Robert Moskowitz <rgm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Actually WPA2 with 802.1X authentication is REALLY tight. No MITM > will crack EAP TLS (EAP TLS is a little different than the TLS used in > the most recent attack). Then use AES CCMP (not TKIP). And there we have the real way in protecting a wifi access point: turn off WEP, WPA (v1), and TKIP (under WPA2). Leave only WPA2 and CCMP. Then let the computer choose a 64-bit hex number for the shared key. Too bad the good advice is always drowned out by the hordes that claim hiding SID's and changing port number on ssh are the way to get security. (For ssh turn off everything but RSA and DSA -- this way the computer chooses a strong "password" (really a secret key) for you.) > Of course your management frames are not protected. That is 802.11w > that will soon be in products.... > > BTW, I worked on the 802.11 standards. I use past tense, as in June > my management had me move over to work on 802.15 standards. (I was in > Atlanta last week for the 802 meeting). Thank you for speaking up! Will the new protocols require any HW support or are they drop-in replacements on current wifi nodes? Will all the packets now be cryptographically protected? -wolfgang -- Wolfgang S. Rupprecht If the airwaves belong to the public why does the public only get 3 non-overlapping WIFI channels? -- fedora-list mailing list fedora-list@xxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Communicate/MailingListGuidelines
