Re: btrfs snapshots, rollbacks

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----- Original Message -----
> From: "Chris Murphy" <lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Thursday, 13 February, 2014 7:13:22 PM
> Subject: Re: btrfs snapshots, rollbacks
> 
> 
> On Feb 13, 2014, at 11:05 AM, Miloslav Trmač <mitr@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 3:16 AM, Chris Murphy <lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> > How significant is the risk of stale binaries being persistently available
> > in the normal file system hierarchy?
> >  Depending on the vulnerability being fixed, up to "critical".
> > 
> > Should something be done to either make sure they aren't persistently
> > available (make sure they aren't available in the mounted file system
> > hierarchy)
> > Yes.
> >  
> > and if they're mounted should noexec or nosuid be used?
> > Probably; A possible alternative would be to mount them into /$snapshots,
> > where $snaphosts is 0700 root-only (and protected by SELinux to only an
> > unconfined administrator) - but without SELinux a root-owned process with
> > no capabilities would still be able to access the files.
> >  
> > Because the snapshot is located within a mounted subvolume, it makes the
> > snapshot's stale binaries persistently available. So restating the earlier
> > question, is this a security risk, how significant is it, and is it worth
> > changing the behavior?
> > 
> > Yes, very, and yes.  (The risk is that there is a security vulnerability in
> > a setuid-root program, and making the vulnerable application runnable by
> > unprivileged users keeps the vulnerability exploitable.  It doesn't matter
> > whether the file is in PATH, or where exactly it is located, as long any
> > process that doesn't have the privileges of an unconfined system
> > administrator can access it.)
> > 
> 
> Interesting :-) two opposite opinions on this.

Not really, I was thinking from a desktop system perspective.

It's completely different matter on a server.

-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
http://wiki.brq.redhat.com/hkario
Email: hkario@xxxxxxxxxx
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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