On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 13:28 -0500, Bill Nottingham wrote: > > >I don't want to ship a desktop that doesn't let the user do useful > > >things. > > > > And you can ship a desktop SPIN that way. But the base pkgs should > > not install with an insecure set of choices. > > > > if you want the spin to have a post-scriptlet which allows more > > things, then that's the choice of the desktop sig over the desktop > > spin. > > Given how .pkla works, this is likely to be done with packages, not > with %post hackery. (Which should make it much easier to reliably > test, as well.) As I noted somewhat flippantly in another thread, this comes with the problem that, theoretically, a user who has the privileges to install packages at a relaxed security level could arbitrarily raise the security level of the system to a much higher level, against the wishes of the administrator. perhaps something akin to system-config-selinux would be needed to guard against this? I'm not sure how it could work in the PolicyKit framework, though. -- Adam Williamson Fedora QA Community Monkey IRC: adamw | Fedora Talk: adamwill AT fedoraproject DOT org http://www.happyassassin.net -- Fedora-security-list mailing list Fedora-security-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-security-list
