strategic voting is voting in a less expressive way that increases your personal expected utility. for instance, the DH3 pathology with condorcet voting (used by debian, unfortunately) is where a candidate wins whom virtually everyone agrees is the worst, because they all use a strategy that is _beneficial_ at the individual level. it's like the prisoners' dilemma. everyone is worse off because they each use an advisable strategy.
an example of strategic voting was when 90% of the nader-supporting voters voted for someone else (namely gore) back in 2000, because that had a higher expected value (where expected value is the chance your vote changes the election outcome times the difference in utility that causes for you).
in score voting, you might actually feel that X=10, Y=7, and Z=0 -- but if Y and Z are the clear front-runners, you can increase your expected value by voting X=10, Y=10, Z=0. that's more strategic.
the nice thing about score voting is that it behaves quite nicely even when people are strategic. here are some links which discuss this.
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html
http://rangevoting.org/PleasantSurprise.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat1.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat4.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat5.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat6.html
http://rangevoting.org/CondBurial.html
regards,
clay
--
clay shentrup
phone: 206.801.0484
"Iraq? No, YOU rock!"
an example of strategic voting was when 90% of the nader-supporting voters voted for someone else (namely gore) back in 2000, because that had a higher expected value (where expected value is the chance your vote changes the election outcome times the difference in utility that causes for you).
in score voting, you might actually feel that X=10, Y=7, and Z=0 -- but if Y and Z are the clear front-runners, you can increase your expected value by voting X=10, Y=10, Z=0. that's more strategic.
the nice thing about score voting is that it behaves quite nicely even when people are strategic. here are some links which discuss this.
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html
http://rangevoting.org/PleasantSurprise.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat1.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat4.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat5.html
http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat6.html
http://rangevoting.org/CondBurial.html
regards,
clay
On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 11:08, inode0 <inode0@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 1:02 PM, CLAY S <clay@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 23, 2008 at 10:37, inode0 <inode0@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Why should Fedora make any of it public knowing that doing so will
>> affect the way people vote?
>
> i'm saying it will affect it _for the better_. which is "bad" from aI misunderstood strategic voting to be a supposed benefit of this.
> research point of view, but good for fedora.
What is meant by "strategic" voting and why is it bad?
John
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clay shentrup
phone: 206.801.0484
"Iraq? No, YOU rock!"
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