Change permission check for setting ACL to use inode_owner_or_capable()
which will additionally allow a CAP_FOWNER user in a user namespace to
be able to set an ACL on an inode covered by the user namespace mapping.
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Dwight Engen <dwight.engen@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
index 306d883..32e4972 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
@@ -68,14 +68,15 @@ xfs_acl_from_disk(
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
+ acl_e->e_uid = xfs_uid_to_kuid(be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id));
+ break;
case ACL_GROUP:
- acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
+ acl_e->e_gid = xfs_gid_to_kgid(be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id));
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
- acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
@@ -101,7 +102,18 @@ xfs_acl_to_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp, const struct posix_acl *acl)
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace->ae_tag = cpu_to_be32(acl_e->e_tag);
- ace->ae_id = cpu_to_be32(acl_e->e_id);
+ switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
+ case ACL_USER:
+ ace->ae_id = cpu_to_be32(xfs_kuid_to_uid(acl_e->e_uid));
+ break;
+ case ACL_GROUP:
+ ace->ae_id = cpu_to_be32(xfs_kgid_to_gid(acl_e->e_gid));
+ break;
+ default:
+ ace->ae_id = cpu_to_be32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
+ break;
+ }
+
ace->ae_perm = cpu_to_be16(acl_e->e_perm);
}
}
@@ -360,7 +372,7 @@ xfs_xattr_acl_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return -EINVAL;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return value ? -EACCES : 0;
- if ((current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (!value)
--
1.8.1.4
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