Re: [PATCH] login-utils: import environment from user manager on systemd systems

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Ray Strode wrote:
Hi,
   Isn't pam_env supposed to allow setting vars in setting up
a user's first login session?
It can, but it has a few problems

1) the file format is kind of weird
---
   People looking at systemd's config files have said similar.

2) not all distros set user_readenv=1 so users cant set the
environment variables they want
----
   pam_env wasn't designed for reading user-set environment variables.
Can users modify systemd config files at will?  Can't users put their
envvars in their profiles?
3) pam_env doesn't provide a facility for 3rd party applications to
adjust the environment
---
   I wasn't aware systemd could read users' profiles.  I've seen
many 3rd party apps add their needed env vars to the system "profile.d"
directory (for system wide changes) and some to a user's shell if they
were user-specific changes.
4) PAM modules run in the context of a user but as root.
----
   Most login related and system security processes do.  They are not
part of the kernel.  Systemd runs in a user-context as root, as well.
Are you saying that is insecure?

`   Pam_env is designed to be run before the user's first session has
been setup and not again.  Some environment variables are meant to have
the same lifetime as the login-(or audit) UID.  Just like TERM, any X
programs rely on DISPLAY and those things don't change unless a
new first-contact session is created when a user first accesses a
secure network from an outside location.
Having a
bunch of independent plugins all running as root, and not necessarily
integrating with each other is a recipe for security problems,
especially if you throw environment variables into the mix.
----
True. The pam modules have been vetted for about 10+ years and have good
security record, yet you seem quite willing to jump to a new solution
without such a track record.
(if pam_env is erroneously in the session stack before a pam_exec
call, the user could easily get root access).
If an administrator misconfigures ANY system security and authentication modules a user could gain root access. Pam_env was designed for a first-contact to the system, as that's the only time 'REMOTEHOST' is set (presuming the user came from another system). Does systemd set REMOTEHOST and allow for a users DISPLAY variable to be defaulted to a dependent setting?
This topic was discussed a bit in the cited systemd pull request, I think.
----
   how is that relevant to a util-linux list?
-l
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