Right at the moment, unprivileged users cannot call mount --bind to create a permanent copy of any of their namespaces. This is annoying because it means that for entry to long running containers you have to spawn an undying process and use nsenter via the /proc/<pid>/ns files. The first question is: assuming we restrict it to bind mounting only nsfs inodes, is there any reason an unprivileged user shouldn't be able to bind a namespace they've created to a file they own in the initial mount namespace? Assuming the answer to this is no, then how to implement it becomes the next problem. Right at the moment, util-linux/mount will deny a non -root user the ability to use --bind. This check could be relaxed and, since mount is setuid root, it could be modified to force the binding as root meaning this could be implemented entirely within the util -linux package. Doing this from within the kernel sys_mount is much more problematic: no root users are forbidden from calling any type of mount by the may_mount() check, which makes sure you only have root capability in the user_ns attached to the current mnt_ns. Overriding that simply to allow nsfs binding looks like a recipe for introducing unexpected security problems. So, does anyone have any strong (or even weak) opinions about this before I start coding patches? James -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe util-linux" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
