The default of global.bootm.verify=hash means that barebox will refuse
to boot images without hashes, but won't bother verifying the signature.
For verified boot setups, this parameter needs to be set to signature,
preferably enforced via CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES.
For everything else, it's better user experience if barebox would just
verify what's available instead of refusing to boot images without hashes,
like the image.fit that Linux can now generate as part of its build.
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
common/bootm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/common/bootm.c b/common/bootm.c
index 80905d4cf1ce..dd9ba2eae3b2 100644
--- a/common/bootm.c
+++ b/common/bootm.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void bootm_data_restore_defaults(const struct bootm_data *data)
bootm_dryrun = data->dryrun;
}
-static enum bootm_verify bootm_verify_mode = BOOTM_VERIFY_HASH;
+static enum bootm_verify bootm_verify_mode = BOOTM_VERIFY_AVAILABLE;
enum bootm_verify bootm_get_verify_mode(void)
{
--
2.39.5
