Re: PCR signing / enrolling on UKI and validation by systemd-cryptenroll

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On Tue, May 28, 2024 at 09:55:36PM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Di, 28.05.24 21:21, Andrei Borzenkov (arvidjaar@xxxxxxxxx) wrote:
> 
> > On 28.05.2024 17:49, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> > >
> > > systemd-cryptenroll supports pin, literal PCR, signed PCR — in any
> > > combination. (plus pcrlock, but that's currently cannot be combined
> > > with signed PCR, because afaics not expressible in the TPM policy language).
> > >
> >
> > Why not? You can AND pcrlock with other policies just like currently literal
> > PCR is ANDed with signed PCR. You can even use signed PCR in pcrlock policy
> > - PolicyOR does not care what policies are combined, literal PCR (like is
> > done currently) or signed PCR. Or what semantic do you have in mind that
> > cannot be expressed?
> 
> pcrlock is ultimately a PolicyAuthorizeNV policy, and signed policies
> use PolicyAuthorize. Both of these policy items do not *extend* the
> policy so far enqueued, but *replace* it instead. (This is different
> from policies such as PolicyPCR or PolicyAuthValue and so on, which
> result in extension, i.e. "AND") Thus, there's not directly obvious
> way how you could combine them.
> 
> (you can of course include PolicyAuthorizeNV in the policy you sign
> for PolicyAuthorize, but that doesn#t work, since we want to pin the
> local nvindex really, and allocate it localy, and the signer (i.e. the
> OS vendor) cannot possibly do that. Or you could include the
> PolicyAuthorize in the policy you store in the nvindex for
> PolicyAuthorizeNV use, but that feels much less interesting since it
> means the enforcement of the combination is subject to local,
> delegated policy choices instead of mandated by the policy of the
> actual object we want to protect)

Does this work in practice?  I agree that this is ugly, but "ugly" might
be better than "not working".

> I have so far not found a nice way out of this problem. Seems to be a
> limitation of the TPM policy language.
> 
> Lennart

-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab

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