Re: CVE-2023-7008 Christmas drama notes

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Hello Luca,

I did not expect normal and honest apology from you right from the start, but I did at least expect *some* reflection. I see none in that long text.

You seem to have very minimal insight into how our internal vulnerability process works, but that does not prevent you judge my guiltiness.

I will leave more discussions after I return to the office. It seems face to face discussion would bring less emotions. I want opinion of people who knew how it happened. Not people who think they know, but have no direct way to know it.

On 12/26/23 11:37, Luca Boccassi wrote:
On Tue, 26 Dec 2023 at 02:30, Petr Menšík <pemensik@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Here's what's really going on: you have found yourself in a position
where, as a RH employee, you could abuse the internal CVE process to
promote your own projects, and that's exactly what you did: without
consulting or notifying anybody who is involved in this project, you
went directly to the security team raise a CVE while we all were on
holiday, and then promptly went on social media to use the CVE to bash
the project and promote your own instead: https://imgur.com/3eqRQcW
You even lied about others in RH being aware that a CVE was raised,
which is obviously not true - those referenced comments were made
months before the CVE was opened. You ignored all processes, went
behind the back of all maintainers - upstream and downstream - in
order to inflict maximum damage at the worst time possible, and then
brag on social media about it. This is a blatant abuse of Redhat's CNA
position, and puts the whole company under a bad light, and casts
doubts over its trustworthiness as the CNA for the project, all
because of your reckless and needless actions. Not content, you even
intentionally avoided to mention in the CVE that this feature is off
by default everywhere, and thus very few users are actually affected -
when CVEs are raised, hardly anybody goes to look for related bug
trackers or issues, and the CVE advisory is all that is used to
establish impact and decide whether action is needed, and there was no
mention anywhere that this requires a local administrator to manually
enable it for a machine to be affected. A _lot_ of work for a _lot_ of
people kicks off every time a CVE is raised, due to automation, and
the correctness of the advisory is fundamental to avoid triggering
unneeded work. You made sure it was worded to give the idea that every
installation was affected, so that it could cause the maximum amount
of panic and damage possible, again so that you could then brag on
social media about it, showing a reckless disregard for the wellbeing
of your colleagues at Redhat, Redhat's customers and all other
downstream users and developers during their holidays.

...

I will ask my manager to read that issue and tell me if I did anything wrong or harmed anyone. I will ask Lukáš for his opinion as well. I do not care about your opinion about me, as I doubt you know me, what or how I do anything.

Given such a record, the Github org owners (plural) collectively
decided that, as the very first and immediate consequence, your
membership of the Github project is not compatible with your
behaviour, and removed you.

Thank you for this part, I did not have to leave it myself. I have had enough and I think I have been very patient. I would like to know which people voted for my membership termination and who against.

Best Regards, Petr

-- 
Petr Menšík
Software Engineer, RHEL
Red Hat, https://www.redhat.com/
PGP: DFCF908DB7C87E8E529925BC4931CA5B6C9FC5CB

Attachment: OpenPGP_0x4931CA5B6C9FC5CB.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key

Attachment: OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


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