Re: why systemd-boot (seems as everyone else) does not check the signatures of initramfs?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hi Andrei, Lennart

@Andrei: Do you think, then, that the same private key used for SecureBoot could be used for GPG signing the initramfs? That would be cool, as the whole boot signing infrastructure would still depend on a single entity.

@Lennart: I was thinking in using a private key for which I'd enroll the certificate in MOK (I mean, just following the standard use case for MOK).

Without having much idea about the code base of systemd-boot, I am willing to give it a try (to a GPG with private key from SB) provided you think is something the community might benefit from. What are your thoughts?

Regards,

--
Felix Rubio
"Don't believe what you're told. Double check."

On 2023-05-24 14:35, Lennart Poettering wrote:
On Mi, 24.05.23 12:22, Felix Rubio (felix@xxxxxxxxx) wrote:

I agree that having a measured boot, that decrypts the system is a better solution... but this is, correct me if wrong, still very green: There are some approaches supported, but none of them seems to be structural: they rely on the existence of a TPM, introduce additional dependencies on the update process (when the kernel/initramfs changes the previous measurement will not be correct anymore and needs to be updated), etc. On the other hand UKI comes with its own challenges, and also forces the admin to rebuild the
UKI any time there is an update.

I feel there should be some middle point in which we do not have to rely on
a TPM and a fully measured system, but we can still make sure that the
initramfs is trusted. The question, then, is: Is this something that could be supported in systemd-boot, or this is something that is considered to be
just out of scope?

As in the other mail: Which key do you intend to use for validation?

Note that in systemd git main there's already support for generating
UKIs dynamically when a kernel RPM/DEB is installed (as long as the
"kernel-install" infra is in use). It can be signed with a local key,
that can be enrolled with MOK.

With that we make it reasonably easy to run a setup with a locally
signed initrd – but it means that you'll get a MOK prompt during at
least one boot.

Lennart

--
Lennart Poettering, Berlin



[Index of Archives]     [LARTC]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite Forum]     [Photo]

  Powered by Linux