Re: sharing of D-Bus connection between systemd PAM modules causes problems

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On Tue, 11 Apr 2023 at 02:15, Norbert Braun <norbert@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I recently ran into a problem on Arch Linux ARM (32 bit) where logging
> in as root on the console would often, but not always, fail (much like
> in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/17266). While investigating
> the problem, I found the following:
>
> Systemd ships with two PAM modules, pam_systemd.so and
> pam_systemd_home.so. Both of these use pam_acquire_bus_connection to
> open a connection to the system bus. pam_acquire_bus_connection opens a
> connection on the first call, then uses pam_set_data and pam_get_data to
> cache the connection object for subsequent calls. Since the namespace
> for pam_set_data/pam_get_data is shared between all PAM modules, it can
> happen that one PAM module opens the connection and another one uses it.
> In my case, pam_systemd_home.so opens the connection and sends the Hello
> message. If the root user attempts to log in, pam_systemd_home.so exits
> early and leaves the connection open, to be re-used by pam_systemd.so.
>
> This is problematic because struct sd_bus contains OrderedHashmap
> *reply_callbacks, and OrderedHashmap internally uses a global variable
> shared_hash_key. The PAM modules are statically linked with libsystemd,
> so this variable effectively exists twice in each of the two PAM
> modules. Since it is initialized to a random value, the value differs
> between the PAM modules. In the scenario above, it therefore differs
> between the sending of the Hello message and the processing of the
> reply. Thus, when the reply to the Hello message arrives, process_reply
> effectively looks for the reply cookie in a random hash bucket, and may
> or may not find it. In the latter case, this eventually leads to the
> somewhat cryptic error message: "pam_systemd(login:session): Failed to
> create session: Input/output error".
>
> The problem is hidden on 64 bit systems, because the sizes of struct
> ordered_hashmap_entry and struct indirect_storage are such that an
> OrderedHashmap with direct storage only has a single bucket, and the
> value of shared_hash_key is therefore irrelevant. On a 32 bit system,
> however, the sizes are such that there are two buckets, and root login
> fails, with 50% probability, with the error message mentioned above. As
> expected from the above, it is possible to cause the problem to appear
> on a 64 bit system by changing "uint8_t _pad[3];" to "uint8_t _pad[19];"
> in struct indirect_storage (in src/basic/hashmap.c).
>
> After the above, another problem surfaces during cleanup: bus_free calls
> ordered_hashmap_free_free(b->reply_callbacks), which calls free on each
> value in the hashmap. However, the struct reply_callback that
> sd_bus_call_async puts into the hashmap was not individually allocated,
> but part of a larger struct sd_bus_slot. free is unhappy about that, and
> the login process finally dies with a segmentation fault, aborting the
> login attempt entirely. This problem is normally hidden by the fact that
> reply_callbacks is empty by the time that bus_free is called.

Could you please file a bug on Github?



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