4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 0be0226f07d14b153a5eedf2bb86e1eb7dcefab5 upstream.
KVM may turn a user page to a kernel page when kernel writes a readonly
user page if CR0.WP = 1. This shadow page entry will be reused after
SMAP is enabled so that kernel is allowed to access this user page
Fix it by setting SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role and reset mmu
once CR4.SMAP is updated
Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +++-----
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ Shadow pages contain the following infor
Contains the value of cr4.smep && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
(pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
+ role.smap_andnot_wp:
+ Contains the value of cr4.smap && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
+ (pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
+ treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
gfn:
Either the guest page table containing the translations shadowed by this
page, or the base page frame for linear translations. See role.direct.
@@ -344,10 +348,16 @@ on fault type:
(user write faults generate a #PF)
-In the first case there is an additional complication if CR4.SMEP is
-enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page, the kernel may now
-execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx. If we get a user
-fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
+In the first case there are two additional complications:
+- if CR4.SMEP is enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page,
+ the kernel may now execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx.
+ If we get a user fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and
+ spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
+- if CR4.SMAP is disabled: since the page has been changed to a kernel
+ page, it can not be reused when CR4.SMAP is enabled. We set
+ CR4.SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role to avoid this case. Note,
+ here we do not care the case that CR4.SMAP is enabled since KVM will
+ directly inject #PF to guest due to failed permission check.
To prevent an spte that was converted into a kernel page with cr0.wp=0
from being written by the kernel after cr0.wp has changed to 1, we make
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
unsigned nxe:1;
unsigned cr0_wp:1;
unsigned smep_andnot_wp:1;
+ unsigned smap_andnot_wp:1;
};
};
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3736,8 +3736,8 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(st
}
}
-void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
+static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
{
unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
u8 map;
@@ -3918,6 +3918,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
bool smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+ bool smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
MMU_WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(context->root_hpa));
@@ -3936,6 +3937,8 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu
context->base_role.cr0_wp = is_write_protection(vcpu);
context->base_role.smep_andnot_wp
= smep && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
+ context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp
+ = smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu);
@@ -4207,12 +4210,18 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *
const u8 *new, int bytes)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = { .word = 0 };
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
u64 entry, gentry, *spte;
int npte;
bool remote_flush, local_flush, zap_page;
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = (union kvm_mmu_page_role) {
+ .cr0_wp = 1,
+ .cr4_pae = 1,
+ .nxe = 1,
+ .smep_andnot_wp = 1,
+ .smap_andnot_wp = 1,
+ };
/*
* If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
@@ -4238,7 +4247,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write;
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PTE_WRITE);
- mask.cr0_wp = mask.cr4_pae = mask.nxe = mask.smep_andnot_wp = 1;
for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp, gfn) {
if (detect_write_misaligned(sp, gpa, bytes) ||
detect_write_flooding(sp)) {
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@ enum {
int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct);
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly);
-void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
- bool ept);
static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
{
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -702,8 +702,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_xcr);
int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
- unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE |
- X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP;
+ unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
+ X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP;
+
if (cr4 & CR4_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
@@ -744,9 +745,6 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u
(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
- if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP)
- update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false);
-
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
--
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