On 01/20, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > The only difference is that sys_uretprobe() is new and existing setups
> > doesn't know about it. Suppose you have
> >
> > int func(void)
> > {
> > return 123;
> > }
> >
> > int main(void)
> > {
> > seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0,0);
> > for (;;)
> > func();
> > }
> >
> > and it runs with func() uretprobed.
> >
> > If you install the new kernel, this application will crash immediately.
> >
> > I understand your objections, but what do you think we can do instead?
> > I don't think a new "try_to_speedup_uretprobes_at_your_own_risk" sysctl
> > makes sense, it will be almost never enabled...
>
> This seems like a uretprobes design problem. If it's going to use
> syscalls, it must take things like seccomp into account.
True. I reviewed that patch, and I forgot about seccomp too.
> SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT will also crash in the face of syscall_restart...
Yes, I guess SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT assumes that read/write can't return
ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK.
But again, what can we do right now?
I do not like the idea to revert the patch which adds sys_uretprobe().
Don't get me wrong, I do not use uprobes, so personally I don't really
care about the performance improvements it adds. Not to mention FRED,
although I have no idea when it will be available.
Lets forget about sys_uretprobe(). Lets suppose the kernel doesn't have
ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK/sys_restart_syscall and we want to add this feature
today.
How do you think we can do this without breaking the existing setups which
use seccomp ?
Oleg.
