On 1/14/25 09:06, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/14/25 08:44, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 08:33:39AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 1/14/25 01:27, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 02:47:56PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>>> On 1/13/25 07:14, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>> Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
>>>>>> arch_memremap_wb()
>>>>>> ioremap_cache()
>>>>>> __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
>>>>>> if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
>>>>>> risky:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
>>>>>> guest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
>>>>>> either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
>>>>>> VMM implementation).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
>>>>>> memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
>>>>>> explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
>>>>>> default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fix the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is enabled.
>>>>>
>>>>> This patch causes my bare-metal system to crash during boot when using
>>>>> mem_encrypt=on:
>>>>>
>>>>> [ 2.392934] efi: memattr: Entry type should be RuntimeServiceCode/Data
>>>>> [ 2.393731] efi: memattr: ! 0x214c42f01f1162a-0xee70ac7bd1a9c629 [type=2028324321|attr=0x6590648fa4209879]
>>>>
>>>> Could you try if this helps?
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> index c38b1a335590..b5051dcb7c1d 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
>>>> if (WARN_ON(!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)))
>>>> return 0;
>>>>
>>>> - tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>> + tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
>>>
>>> Well that would work for SME where EFI tables/data are not encrypted,
>>> but will break for SEV where EFI tables/data are encrypted.
>>
>> Hm. Why would it break for SEV? It brings the situation back to what it
>> was before the patch.
>
> Ah, true. I can try it and see how much further SME gets. Hopefully it
> doesn't turn into a whack-a-mole thing.
Unfortunately, it is turning into a whack-a-mole thing.
But it looks the following works for SME:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 3c36f3f5e688..ff3cd5fc8508 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
{
- if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);
I haven't had a chance to test the series on SEV, yet.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>>
>> Note that that __ioremap_caller() would still check io_desc.flags before
>> mapping it as decrypted.
>>
