6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Disseldorp <ddiss@xxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit e017671f534dd3f568db9e47b0583e853d2da9b5 ]
The initramfs filename field is defined in
Documentation/driver-api/early-userspace/buffer-format.rst as:
37 cpio_file := ALGN(4) + cpio_header + filename + "\0" + ALGN(4) + data
...
55 ============= ================== =========================
56 Field name Field size Meaning
57 ============= ================== =========================
...
70 c_namesize 8 bytes Length of filename, including final \0
When extracting an initramfs cpio archive, the kernel's do_name() path
handler assumes a zero-terminated path at @collected, passing it
directly to filp_open() / init_mkdir() / init_mknod().
If a specially crafted cpio entry carries a non-zero-terminated filename
and is followed by uninitialized memory, then a file may be created with
trailing characters that represent the uninitialized memory. The ability
to create an initramfs entry would imply already having full control of
the system, so the buffer overrun shouldn't be considered a security
vulnerability.
Append the output of the following bash script to an existing initramfs
and observe any created /initramfs_test_fname_overrunAA* path. E.g.
./reproducer.sh | gzip >> /myinitramfs
It's easiest to observe non-zero uninitialized memory when the output is
gzipped, as it'll overflow the heap allocated @out_buf in __gunzip(),
rather than the initrd_start+initrd_size block.
---- reproducer.sh ----
nilchar="A" # change to "\0" to properly zero terminate / pad
magic="070701"
ino=1
mode=$(( 0100777 ))
uid=0
gid=0
nlink=1
mtime=1
filesize=0
devmajor=0
devminor=1
rdevmajor=0
rdevminor=0
csum=0
fname="initramfs_test_fname_overrun"
namelen=$(( ${#fname} + 1 )) # plus one to account for terminator
printf "%s%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%s" \
$magic $ino $mode $uid $gid $nlink $mtime $filesize \
$devmajor $devminor $rdevmajor $rdevminor $namelen $csum $fname
termpadlen=$(( 1 + ((4 - ((110 + $namelen) & 3)) % 4) ))
printf "%.s${nilchar}" $(seq 1 $termpadlen)
---- reproducer.sh ----
Symlink filename fields handled in do_symlink() won't overrun past the
data segment, due to the explicit zero-termination of the symlink
target.
Fix filename buffer overrun by aborting the initramfs FSM if any cpio
entry doesn't carry a zero-terminator at the expected (name_len - 1)
offset.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@xxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241030035509.20194-2-ddiss@xxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
init/initramfs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
index bc911e466d5bb..b2f7583bb1f5c 100644
--- a/init/initramfs.c
+++ b/init/initramfs.c
@@ -360,6 +360,15 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
{
state = SkipIt;
next_state = Reset;
+
+ /* name_len > 0 && name_len <= PATH_MAX checked in do_header */
+ if (collected[name_len - 1] != '\0') {
+ pr_err("initramfs name without nulterm: %.*s\n",
+ (int)name_len, collected);
+ error("malformed archive");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (strcmp(collected, "TRAILER!!!") == 0) {
free_hash();
return 0;
@@ -424,6 +433,12 @@ static int __init do_copy(void)
static int __init do_symlink(void)
{
+ if (collected[name_len - 1] != '\0') {
+ pr_err("initramfs symlink without nulterm: %.*s\n",
+ (int)name_len, collected);
+ error("malformed archive");
+ return 1;
+ }
collected[N_ALIGN(name_len) + body_len] = '\0';
clean_path(collected, 0);
init_symlink(collected + N_ALIGN(name_len), collected);
--
2.43.0
