Re: [PATCH] arm64: uaccess: Restrict user access to kernel memory in __copy_user_flushcache()

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On Fri, Nov 15, 2024 at 02:52:07PM -0600, Gax-c wrote:
> From: Zichen Xie <zichenxie0106@xxxxxxxxx>
> 
> raw_copy_from_user() do not call access_ok(), so this code allowed
> userspace to access any virtual memory address. Change it to
> copy_from_user().

How can you access *any* virtual memory address, given that we force the
address to map userspace via __uaccess_mask_ptr()?

> Fixes: 9e94fdade4d8 ("arm64: uaccess: simplify __copy_user_flushcache()")

I don't think that commit changed the semantics of the code, so if it's
broken then I think it was broken before that change as well.

> Signed-off-by: Zichen Xie <zichenxie0106@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
>  arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c b/arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c
> index 7510d1a23124..fb138a3934db 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c
> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_user_flushcache(void *to, const void __user *from,
>  {
>  	unsigned long rc;
>  
> -	rc = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> +	rc = copy_from_user(to, from, n);

Does anybody actually call this with an unchecked user address?


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