5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx>
commit 0fad2878642ec46225af2054564932745ac5c765 upstream.
entry_ibpb() is designed to follow Intel's IBPB specification regardless
of CPU. This includes invalidating RSB entries.
Hence, if IBPB on VMEXIT has been selected, entry_ibpb() as part of the
RET untraining in the VMEXIT path will take care of all BTB and RSB
clearing so there's no need to explicitly fill the RSB anymore.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1062,6 +1062,14 @@ do_cmd_auto:
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
mitigate_smt = true;
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+
break;
default:
@@ -2465,6 +2473,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
