5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx> commit 3ea87dfa31a7b0bb0ff1675e67b9e54883013074 upstream. Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -456,4 +456,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ #define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ #define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */ +#define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */ +#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1335,6 +1335,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;
