6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx> commit 50e4b3b94090babe8d4bb85c95f0d3e6b07ea86e upstream. entry_ibpb() should invalidate all indirect predictions, including return target predictions. Not all IBPB implementations do this, in which case the fallback is RSB filling. Prevent SRSO-style hijacks of return predictions following IBPB, as the return target predictor can be corrupted before the IBPB completes. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/segment.h> #include <asm/cache.h> +#include <asm/cpufeatures.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" @@ -17,6 +19,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax xorl %edx, %edx wrmsr + + /* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET RET SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) /* For KVM */
