On Fri, Oct 04, 2024 at 07:34:41PM +0000, Eric Biggers wrote:
From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 4f5a100f87f32cb65d4bb1ad282a08c92f6f591e upstream.
The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for
inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or
Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID
matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true.
There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write
particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this
can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can
truncate an inode to size 0
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert
changes another process concurrently made to a file
Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for
F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these
ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break
anything.
Fixes: 88b88a667971 ("f2fs: support atomic writes")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
I've queued these backports, thanks!
--
Thanks,
Sasha
