5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Hanxiao <chenhx.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 33c94d7e3cb84f6d130678d6d59ba475a6c489cf ]
don't return 0 if snd_buf->len really greater than snd_buf->buflen
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhx.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 0c77668ddb4e ("SUNRPC: Introduce trace points in rpc_auth_gss.ko")
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index 2ff66a6a7e54c..7ce4a6b7cfae6 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -1855,8 +1855,10 @@ gss_wrap_req_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
maj_stat = gss_wrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, snd_buf, inpages);
/* slack space should prevent this ever happening: */
- if (unlikely(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen))
+ if (unlikely(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen)) {
+ status = -EIO;
goto wrap_failed;
+ }
/* We're assuming that when GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED, the encryption was
* done anyway, so it's safe to put the request on the wire: */
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
--
2.43.0
