Patch "userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings" has been added to the 3.10-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

to the 3.10-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     userns-don-t-allow-unprivileged-creation-of-gid-mappings.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.10 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.


>From be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 18:14:19 -0600
Subject: userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.

As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.

For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality.  This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c

Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups.  Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.

For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -810,11 +810,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
 				return true;
 		}
-		else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
-			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
-				return true;
-		}
 	}
 
 	/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx are

queue-3.10/mnt-update-unprivileged-remount-test.patch
queue-3.10/userns-check-euid-no-fsuid-when-establishing-an-unprivileged-uid-mapping.patch
queue-3.10/mnt-implicitly-add-mnt_nodev-on-remount-when-it-was-implicitly-added-by-mount.patch
queue-3.10/userns-don-t-allow-unprivileged-creation-of-gid-mappings.patch
queue-3.10/userns-rename-id_map_mutex-to-userns_state_mutex.patch
queue-3.10/userns-add-a-knob-to-disable-setgroups-on-a-per-user-namespace-basis.patch
queue-3.10/userns-allow-setting-gid_maps-without-privilege-when-setgroups-is-disabled.patch
queue-3.10/userns-don-t-allow-setgroups-until-a-gid-mapping-has-been-setablished.patch
queue-3.10/groups-consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch
queue-3.10/userns-only-allow-the-creator-of-the-userns-unprivileged-mappings.patch
queue-3.10/userns-document-what-the-invariant-required-for-safe-unprivileged-mappings.patch
queue-3.10/umount-disallow-unprivileged-mount-force.patch
queue-3.10/userns-unbreak-the-unprivileged-remount-tests.patch
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